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In recent years television networks which air political campaign debates
have attempted to enforce their copyright protection by denying the use of
debate footage in subsequent campaign advertising. Although some
campaigns have complied with network demands to omit the footage fi-om
campaign ads, others have relied upon a fair use or fiee speech argument to
defy the networks and use the footage without permission. The success of
this defense will vary drastically, depending upon the medium. Ads run on
television are subject to traditional copyright law that requires the copyright
holder to affirmatively assert a claim of copyright infringement. Although
several networks have threatened legal action, no court has yet determined
whether such ads are indeed a fair use of the copyrighted material. When
political campaigns upload ads for viewing on the Internet through sites such
as YouTube, the process set forth in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA) gives the networks the ability to takedown allegedly infiinging
content almost immediately, without first showing that the material infringes
upon an existing copyright. This use of the DMCA has the effect of chilling
important political speech, especially in a rapid campaign cycle. This article
analyzes this issue, showing first that the use of campaign debate footage is
indeed a fair use, and then reviewing and critiquing various proposals for
reform of the DMCA.
Part II of this article presents the factual backdrop upon which this issue
must be analyzed. Part III discusses traditional copyright protection and the
fair use exception. It also explores the intersection of copyright law and the
important free speech issues these cases present. Part IV analyzes the fair
use defense as applied to this situation and suggests the likely outcome.
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should such a case ever go to trial.' Part V discusses the related topic of the
DMCA as it applies to intemet service providers (ISPs) such as YouTube and
explains how a holding of fair use could have important implications for
political speech on the Intemet. It suggests that a holding in favor of making
debate footage available for all candidates to use in political advertising is
essential to ensuring full and fair debate of ideas and issues within the
political process. Part VI concludes.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Early in the primary season of the 2008 U.S. presidential race, a
bipartisan group, which later became known as the Open Debate Coalition,^
formed to push for the free, public use of televised presidential debate
footage. The coalition urged both the Republican and Democratic national
committees to require any networks that aired presidential debates to either
put the debate footage into the public domain, or at least allow its
unrestrained use.^ Democratic candidates John Edwards and Barack Obama,
among various others, supported the movement.''
' The plaintiffs in such a case would be the news network organization challenging the use of
its copyright. The defendant would be the creator / disseminator of a political ad featuring
portions of the debate footage, who may or may not be the candidate.
The Open Debate Coalition described itself as "a coalition of people and organizations across
the ideological spectrum" which urged the candidates in the 2008 presidential election to
commit to the principles of open debate. Among the members of the Open Debate Coalition
were Professor Lawrence Lessig, Stanford Law School Professor and founder of the Center for
Intemet and Society; Craig Newmark, founder of Craigslist; Jimmy Wales, founder of
Wikipedia; David Kralick, Director of Intemet Strategy for Newt Gingrich's American
Solutions; Eli Pariser, Executive Director of MoveOn.Org; Ariarma Huffmgton, founder of the
Huffmgton Post; Markos Moulitsas, founder ofDailyKos.com; and Robert Greenwald,
President of Brave New Films. See Lawrence Lessig, Free Debates: Round Two, LESSIG.2.0
BLOG (Sept. 25, 2008), http://lessig.org/blog/2008/09/fi-ee_debates_round_two.html.
^ Id. See also, Lawrence Lessig, A Call on the RNC and DNC to Eliminate Unnecessary
Regulation of Political Speech, LESSIG.2.0 BLOG (Apr. 25, 2007),
http://lessig.org/blog/2007/04/a_call_on_the_mc_dnc_to_elimi.html.
'' Nate Anderson, No Debate: Obama, Edwards, GOP Bloggers Support Free Access to
Footage, ARSTECHNICA (May 4, 2007), http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2007/05/no-debate-
obama-edwards-gop-bloggers-support-free-access-to-footage.ars; John Eggerton, Obama
Wants Debate Footage Copyright Waived, BROADCASTING & CABLE (May 3, 2007); Lawrence
Lessig, Obama on "Open Debates, " LESSIG.2.0 BLOG (Oct. 4, 2008),
http://www.lessig.org/blog/2008/10/obama_on_open_debates_l.html; Andrew Noyes, Internet
Portion of Tonight's Debate To Be Scrutinized, CONGRESS DAILY ( 2008 WLNR 19086148,
Oct. 7, 2008); Jon Stokes, Campaign to Make '08 Debate Footage "Free as in Speech "
Marches On, ARSTECHNICA (May 7, 2008), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/news/2007/05/campaign-to-make-08-debate-footage-free-as-in-speech-marches-on.ars.
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Most major news network organizations agreed,^ except for Fox News,
which refused and denied permission to at least two candidates, John McCain
and Mitt Romney, both of whom had created campaign ads featuring small
portions of debates aired on Fox News.* Nevertheless, dtiring the primary
both Romney and McCain defied Fox News' cease-and-desist requests, at
least with regard to their campaign ads run on television.'
The Romney campaign relied upon a free speech argument in its letter
to Fox explaining its decision to begin mnning an ad featuring a clip from a
televised debate:
[T]he Romney campaign's use of a very short debate clip to deliver
a message about Govemor Romney is the very essence of political
speech protected by the First Amendment. In addition to the First
Amendment, statutes and numerous court decisions protect a
political campaign's use of this material in this fashion. . . . As for
the law, the First Amendment's right of free speech protects the use
of relevant information such as this in the public discourse. The
' Hugh D'Andrade, Let 1,000 YouTube Debate Remixes Bloom!, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUNDATION (Aug. 10, 2007), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2007/08/let-l-000-youtube-
debate-remixes-bloom. According to D'Andrade, CNN and ABC made their footage available
without restriction. NBC agreed to release footage so long as the MSNBC credit was visible,
and the footage was used for non-commercial purposes. See also, Nate Anderson, MSNBC
Restricts Internet Redistribution of Debate; Joe Biden Ignores Them, ARSTECHNICA (Apr. 30,
2007), http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2007/04/msnbc-supplies-gas-matches-to-bloggers-
after-limiting-use-of-debate-footage.ars.
' Lawrence Lessig, Copyright and Politics Don't Mix, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/21/opinion/211essig.html. See also, Jim Rutenberg, Fox
Orders Halt to McCain Ad, THE CAUCUS - THE POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT BLOG OF THE N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 25, 2007), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/10/25/fox-orders-halt-to-
mccain-ad/; Fox Bars Candidates from Using Its Images, THE CAUCUS - THE POLITICS AND
GOVERNMENT BLOG OF THE N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26,2007),
http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/10/26/fox-says-all-candidates-to-stop-using-images-
from-news-channel/.
' Lessig, Copyright and Politics Don't Mix, supra note 6; Greg Sargent, Romney Defies Fox
News ' Ban on Use of its Debate Footage, TALKING POINTS MEMO - ELECTION CENTRAL (NOV.
2, 2007),
http://tpmelectioncentral.talkingpointsmemo.eom/2007/l l/_romney_defies_fox_news_ban_on
_use_of_its_debate_footage.php. The McCain campaign also ignored a later demand letter
from Fox News that the campaign remove the voice of Fox News Correspondent Major
Garrett from an ad the campaign began running in September, 2008. See Ben Smith, McCain
Camp Rebuffs Fox Request, POLITICO (Sept. 19, 2008),
http://www.politico.com/blogs/jonathanmartin/0908/McCain_camp_rebuffs_Fox_request.html
. The Obama Campaign encountered a similar issue with NBC over its own video posted on
YouTube. See John Eggerton, Obama Campaign's VoteForChange.com Posts YouTube Video
Featuring NBC News Anchors Brokaw, Olbermann 'Pronouncing' McCain Election Winner,
BROADCASTING & CABLE (Oct. 1, 2008), http://www.broadcastingcable.eom/article/l 15679-
NBC_Obama_Campaign_Spar_Over_YouTube_Video.php.
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campaign's use of these statements places this very relevant
information in the marketplace of ideas that is a protected part of
the discussion of the public policy positions of candidates for
President of the United States.^
In its own letter to Fox News, the McCain campaign argued that
McCain's right to fi-ee speech, and the fair use defense to copyright
infringement, supported the unauthorized use of a clip taken from an
October, 2007, presidential debate in Florida:
[T]he Campaign's minimal usage of Senator McCain's own
comments in the debate clearly constitutes "fair use" under U.S.
Copyright Law. . . . As you are undoubtedly aware, over the course
of many decades, U.S. law has continually recognized (both in the
early common law and as later codified by statute at 17 USC 107)
that such "fair use" of a newsworthy clip by a secondary user -
such as the McCain Campaign - is clearly permitted. Indeed, the
Fair Use doctrine, recognized in every jurisdiction, unequivocally
permits a secondary use of an original copyrighted work where, as
here, the length of the material is so very minor as compared to the
whole, where the secondary use is absolutely and exclusively non-
commercial in nature, where the Campaign's advertisement has
materially transformed the original clip, and where the
advertisement would have no adverse effect on the potential market
for, or value of, the original work. When considering the core First
Amendment principles that this doctrine serves to protect, and the
value the Courts place on political debate, the Campaign has not
removed the FNC debate footage from its advertisement.'
However, the McCain campaign quickly leamed that cease-and-desist
requests are not so easily defied when they take the form of a takedown
notice sent to an ISP, such as YouTube, pursuant to the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA). In the same presidential election, upon leaming
that McCain's ads containing debate footage were also available for public
viewing on YouTube, Fox News sent a take-down notice to YouTube
demanding that it pull the ads, which YouTube did immediately upon receipt
Sargent, supra note 7. Apparently this letter was not sent as a reply to an official Fox News
cease-and-desist order, but instead was likely sent in anticipation of such a letter, since the
McCain campaign had just made headlines regarding the issue and its response to Fox News.
' Letter from Trevor Potter, General Counsel for McCain for President Campaign, to
Christopher J. Silvestri, Fox News Vice President for Legal and Business Affairs (Oct. 25,
2007), http://markhalperin.files.wordpress.com/2007/L0/mccain-doc.pdf
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of the notice. The McCain campaign objected to YouTube's acquiescence to
the take-down notice, making a fair use argument similar to the one it had
made previously to Fox News.'" McCain also suggested to YouTube that it
conduct a more careful review of takedown notices involving content
uploaded by political campaigns:
We fully understand that YouTube may receive too many videos,
and too many takedown notices, to be able to conduct full fair-use
review of all such notices. But we believe it would consume few
resources - and provide enormous benefit - for YouTube to
commit to a frill legal review of all takedown notices on videos
posted from accounts controlled by (at least) political candidates
and campaigns. If YouTube receives a takedown notice for any
video posted from such accounts, we propose that it commit to a
careful legal review, including a fair use analysis, to determine
whether the infringement claim has substantial merit. If YouTube
is satisfied that the use at issue is fair, or otherwise non-infringing,
we propose that it decline to act upon the notice. Surely the
protection of core political speech, and the protection of the central
role YouTube has come to play in the country's political discourse,
is worth the small amount of additional legal work our proposal
would require."
YouTube rebuffed McCain's suggestion, contending that it was "not a
viable solution."'^ YouTube pointed out that a determination of fair use
'" Lessig, Copyright and Politics Don't Mix, supra note 6. See also, Austin Modine, McCain
Begs for YouTube DMCA To/tei/own/ramMn/iy, THE REGISTER (Oct. 15,2008),
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/10/15/mccain_campaign_wants_youtube_dmca_special_tre
atment/; Sarah Lai Stirland, Stifled by Copyright, McCain Asks YouTube to Consider Fair
Use, WIRED (Oct. 14, 2008), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/10/stifled-by-copy/;
Campaign Takedown Troubles: How Meritless Copyright Claims Threaten Online Political
Speech, REPORT OF THE CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECHNOLOGY (Sept. 2010),
http://www.cdt.org/report/campaign-takedown-troubles-how-meritless-copyright-claims-
threaten-online-political-speech.
" Letter fi-om Trevor Potter, General Counsel for McCain for President Campaign, to Chad
Hurley, YouTube CEO, Zahavah Levine, YouTube General Counsel, and William Patry,
YouTube Senior Copyright Counsel (Oct. 13, 2008),
http://www. wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/fües/mccain_youtube_copyright_letter_l 0.13
.08-3.pdf See also, Wendy Seltzer, McCain's YouTube Takedowns Inspire Fair Use Fervor,
CITIZEN MEDIA LAW PROJECT (Oct. 15,2008),
http://www.citmedialaw.org/blog/2008/mccains-youtube-takedowns-inspire-fair-use-fervor.
'^  Sarah Lai Stirland, YouTube to McCain: You Made Your DMCA Bed, Lie In It, WIRED
(Oct. 15, 2008), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/10/youtube-to-mcca/. See also,
David Ardia, Copyright, Politics, and McCain's Request for Special Treatment, CITIZEN
MEDIA LAW PROJECT (Oct. 21, 2008), http://www.citmedialaw.org/blog/2008/copyright-
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requires such a subjective balancing that "[n]o number of lawyers could
possibly determine with a reasonable level of certainty whether all the videos
for which we receive disputed takedown notices qualify as fair use."'^
YouTube also claimed to lack the information necessary to determine
whether any user-uploaded video was a copyright infringement and therefore
had no basis upon which to verify claims. Finally, YouTube acknowledged
that while presidential campaigns are certainly "worthy of the highest level
of protection," it also hosts other equally worthy content and must treat "all
users fairly, regardless of whether they are an individual, a large corporation
or a candidate for public office."''* YouTube ended the letter by stating that
it looked forward "to working with Senator (or President) McCain on ways
to combat abuse of the DMCA takedown process on YouTube, including, by
way of example, strengthening the fair use doctrine, so that intermediaries
like us can rely on this important doctrine with a measure of business
certainty."'^
This scenario has not been limited to national politics - it has also been
repeated at state-wide and local levels.'* For instance, on October 5, 2010,
Idaho Public Television (IPTV) and the Idaho League of Women Voters
hosted a televised political debate between two candidates for Idaho
Superintendent of Public Instruction, Republican Tom Luna and Democrat
Stan Olson.'^ During the debate, both candidates were asked whether they
would be willing to take the Idaho Standards Achievement Test (ISAT),
which all Idaho high school seniors must pass to graduate, and have their pay
politics-and-mccains-request-special-treatment; Wendy Seltzer, Free Speech Unmoored in
Copyright's Safe Harbor: Chilling Effects of the DMCA on the First Amendment, 24 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 171 (Fall 2010).
'•* Stirland, YouTube to McCain, supra note 12.
'*id
"Id
'* According to the Center for Democracy and Technology report. Campaign Takedown
Troubles: How Meritless Copyright Claims Threaten Online Political Speech, supra note 10,
at 2, DMCA takedowns occur often in political campaigns. "[T]his issue, far from being
limited to the McCain Campaign or to one or two isolated incidents, appears to recur with
considerable frequency and is well known to campaign professionals from across the political
spectrum. The takedowns, too, have come from a wide variety of news organizations; the
incidents . . . involve takedovm demands from CBS, Fox, MSNBC, National Public Radio
(NPR), and the Christian Broadcasting Network (CBN)." See also. Seltzer, Free Speech
Unmoored, supra note 12, at 210, who also describes various instances of "takedowns of
allegedly infHnging material."




based upon their test results.'^ Candidate Olson responded that he would not
want to take the math portion of the test because he had always struggled at
math."
After the debate was televised, Melaleuca, Inc., an Idaho corporation
headed by prominent Idaho Republican Frank VanderSloot, created and paid
for a 60-second televised ad in support of Luna's campaign which contained
that portion of the debate where Olson described his challenges with math.^"
Before running the ad, Melaleuca asked IPTV for permission to use the
debate footage, which IPTV denied.^' Nonetheless, Melaleuca ran the ad on
several television stations throughout Idaho.^^ IPTV sent Melaleuca a cease-
and-desist letter, asserting its copyright protection and demanding that
Melaleuca pull the ads.^ ^ Melaleuca refused, relying upon a free speech and
fair use defense.^" IPTV threatened legal action, but no further action has
been reported, as the case appears to have been quietly shelved.^^ After the
controversy over the ad arose, at least one state network news organization
refused to air it.^ *
'* Betsy Z. Russell, Idaho Schools Race Draws Independent Spending, THE SPOKESMAN
REVIEW (Oct. 22, 2010), http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2010/oct/22/idaho-schools-race-
draws-independent-spending/.
" Id. Russell also suggested that "VanderSloot's ad belittles Olson, the recently retired
superintendent of the Boise School District, with a digitally altered clip. . . . " ) . See also, Sven
Berg, Melaleuca Refuses to Pull Ad, ALLBUSINESS (Oct. 26, 2010).
^^  Jamie Grey, Ad Watch: Copyright Question In New Luna Support Ad, KTVB.COM (Oct. 22,
2010), http://www.ktvb.com/news/Ad-Watch-105582963.html. Grey's article also explained
that some of the footage shown in the ad was altered from the original by changing the speed
of the clip, inserting a dated version of the IPTV logo, and adding "ominous" music over
Olson's statements. Despite a request to Melaleuca, Inc., I have been unable to obtain a copy
of this ad. Therefore, I can only rely upon the descriptions found in the newspaper coverage.
In addition to copyright infringement issues, the use of the dated IPTV logo may raise
trademark violation issues, which are outside the scope of this article.
'^ Russell, supra note 18.
''Id
'^ Grey, supra note 20. See also. Tammy Harmer, Melaleuca versus Idaho Public Television,
KIDK.COM (Oct. 22, 2010), http://www.kidk.com/zcommunities/105572878.html.
''* Harmer, supra note 23. ("We checked with our legal counsel. Our people have told us we
do have a right to do it, that under the fair use doctrine, those ads and material can be used. It
is a matter of free speech.") See also. Berg, supra note 19 ("'Their copyright - if one exists -
would not prevent its use the way we're using it.'").
'^ Russell, supra note 18. ("Peter Morrill, IPTV general manager, said, 'We are not issuing
them a license to utilize footage for their campaign purposes and ... we would ask them to
cease and desist.' The network will 'vigorously' defend its copyright, he said, just as do
networks across the country that air televised political debates."). I have been unable to
determine the current status of this case, and whether IPTV intends to move forward with this
case.
*^ Grey, supra note 20. ("That ad is not airing on KTVB right now. Here's what the station's
general manager Doug Armstrong has to say: 'We have two very different and opposing
opinions regarding the legal right to use IPTV video in a commercial. It's our view that the
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In 2008, in Schenectady, New York, a Democratic candidate for the
New York State Assembly, Mark Blanchfield, released television and radio
advertisements which included a brief clip of his opponent, George
Amedore, stating in an interview with an Albany paper that, "I don't look at
the Assembly position as a job."^' Both Amadore and the Albany Business
Review objected to Blanchfield's ads. Amadore argued that the ads
portrayed his comments out of context. The newspaper alleged that the ads
infringed upon its copyright protection and demanded that Blanchfield pull
the ads off the air.^ ^ Blanchfield ultimately pulled the ad from the air after a
local Fair Campaign Practices Committee agreed with Amadore that the ad
was unfair.^' (It is unclear whether the Albany Business Review's claim of
copyright infiingement impacted this decision).
Thus, although most network news organizations have chosen to waive
whatever rights they may have had in televised debate footage, others, such
as Fox News and EPTV, have taken the opposite approach and (at least
initially) sought to enforce their copyright protection. Networks may deny
permission to use debate footage for varied reasons. Peter Morrill, JPTV
general manager, explained that JPTV denied permission to use the debate
footage in the Idaho Superintendent race on faimess grotinds since JPTV had
previously denied other candidates the right to use its debate footage for
campaign advertising.^" Morrill also explained that restricting the use of
debate footage was necessary to maintain the integrity of the debate process
by insuring the availabilify of friture debates:
copyright issue should be settled before we air the commercial, and we encourage both parties
to seek settlement,' Armstrong said.").
Lessig, Copyright and Politics Don't Mix, supra note 6.
*^ Id. See also, Anthony Falzone, Albany Business Review Tries to Use Bogus Copyright
Claim to Silence NY Assembly Candidate, THE CENTER FOR INTERNET AND SOCIETY (Oct. 13,
2008), http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/node/5885; Steve Ference, Political Ad Continues to
Create Controversy, YOUR NEWS Now (Oct. 10, 2008),
http://capitalregion.ynn.com/content/top_stories/125743/political-ad-continues-to-create-
controversy/.
^' Lauren Stanforth, Amedore and Blanchfield - At It Again Update, TIME UNION (Oct. 20,
2008), http://blog.timesunion.com/localpolitics/2073/amedore-and-blanchfield-at-it-again/.
*^* In the same election cycle in Idaho, at least one candidate, Raul Labrador, a candidate for
the U.S. House of Representatives, pulled an ad containing IPTV debate footage when asked.
See Kevin Richert: The Melaleuca Rules - A New Election Tradition, THE IDAHO STATESMAN
(Oct. 30, 2010),
http://voices.idahostatesman.com/2010/10/25/krichert/idaho_elections_melaleuca_rules_anoth
er_questionable_lastminute_?page=l. Candidates who agreed to participate in IPTV debates
apparently pledged beforehand not to use debate footage in subsequent campaign advertising.
However, VanderSloot was not a participant in the debate and therefore was not bound by the
pledge Tom Luna presumably made to IPTV. See also, Marty Trillhaase, It's Luna's Choice
to Rescue the Idaho Debates, LEWISTON MORNING TRIB. (Oct. 30, 2010).
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Part of the currency, the value of debates, is to create a level
playing field. . . Anytime a candidate feels they're not going to be
treated fairly, and this is just one example of candidates not getting
a good sense their images will be used appropriately, it will only
undermine the debate organizing process. . . . We don't think
having third parties excerpt segments of the debates serves the
public good well; hence, we will defend our copyright.^'
Others have suggested that networks deny permission to use debate
footage "to avoid controversy or embarrassment,"^^ or even due to "concems
over reputation and false endorsement."" The Center for Democracy and
Technology, in its report Campaign Takedown Troubles: How Meritless
Copyright Claims Threaten Online Political Speech, theorized that:
[T]he motivations behind news networks' takedown demands
appear to have little to do with the copyrights the DMCA was
created to help enforce. The networks, often by their own
admission, seem to be taking advantage of the DMCA's notice-
and-takedown system as a blunt tool to restrict use of their works in
political contexts. The interests they are seeking to protect appear
to concem their integrity, reputation, or false association, rather
than exploitation, market substitution or incentive destmction.
These are trademark-type interests that may not even be legally
cognizable. In any event, enforcing such interests using the DMCA
could significantly inhibit legitimate editorial reporting in core
political speech.^ **
Grey, supra note 20. Other editorial commentators made a similar argument. For instance,
Kevin Richert of the Ldaho Statesman argued: "IPTV has been bullied into a bind. The station
can roll over to a well-heeled political player and let VanderSloot use the debate footage Ln an
attack ad. This would cheapen the brand of the decades-long 'Ldaho Debates' franchise - and
gives fliture candidates reason to be gun-shy about appearing in a debate where anything said
can and will be used against a candidate in a smear." See Richert, supra note 30.
Lessig, Copyright and Politics, supra note 6.
'^ Campaign Takedown Troubles, supra note 10, at 2.
^^  Id at 14. See also. Stokes, supra note 4 ("[I]t's not hard to see why the networks are
reluctant to set a precedent by caving in to the public's demands that they authorize any of
their footage for unrestricted public use. Right now, content owners are in a pitched battle
with Intemet outlets like YouTube over the fundamentals of copyright in the digital age. And
because copyright law operates under an 'enforce it vigorously or lose it' model, content
owners are right to fear that they may accidentally give up more than they bargained for. This
fear is certainly what's behind the amount of text that CNN's announcement devoted to
describing the singular nature of the presidential debate as 'an integral part of our system of
government' - the real point being that nobody should expect that any sort of precedent is
being set by the network's move. Lf the other networks foLlow CNN's lead in releasing their
debate footage out into the wild, their announcements will certainly contain similar precedent-
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Despite their threats of legal action against campaigns who have
disregarded cease-and-desist requests and run ads with campaign footage on
television, no network has as yet followed through with a subsequent lawsuit
alleging copyright infringement. Indeed, IPTV's current lack of follow-
through on its threat of litigation may disappoint Melaleuca CEO
VanderSloot, who claimed to welcome a lawsuit challenging his ad because
he hopes to set "the precedent that you can use debate material - a
candidate's own words - to make public what they said."^'
While a lawsuit would clearly set a precedent, surprisingly, despite the
increasing number of these situations, no court has heard or decided the issue
of whether copyright-protected political debate footage may be used in
campaign advertising. In fact, there is very little case law regarding the
intersection of political speech and copyright law at all.^ * As the court stated
in one of the few such cases, American Family Life Insurance Co. v. Hagan:
[T]here is at least one aspect to this case that makes it different
from virtually any other the Court can find: the alleged infringer is
a politician in the midst of a campaign, and he is using the
allegedly infringing materials in furtherance of that campaign.
Only one other case cited by the parties has any apparent factual
similarity, and it is still unresolved; although the court in the case
denied a motion for TRO, it has not issued any substantive written
opinion. . . . Thus, while the cases cited by the parties are
instructive, none is "on all fours with the instant ^^
neutralizing language about the exceptional nature of the presidential debate as an American
institution.").
•'^  Berg, supra note 19.
^' See, e.g., Henley v. DeVore, 733 F.Supp.2d 1144 (2010); Browne v. McCain, 611
F.Supp.2d 1073 (2009); Mastercard v Nader, 2004 WL 434404 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Am. Family
Life Ins. Co. v. Hagan, 266 F.Supp.2d 682 (2002); Keep Thomson Govemor Comm. v.
Citizens for Gallen Comm., 457 F.Supp. 957 (1978^. For various reasons, these cases relating
directly to copyright infringement claims by a political campaign are not entirely relevant to
this issue. For instance, Browne v. McCain and Keep Thompson Governor involved the use of
songs, which requires a slightly differently analysis. Browne v. McCain ultimately settled
after the court denied McCain's 12(b)(6) motion seeking to dismiss the case. Mastercard v.
Nader and Am. Family Life v. Hagan provide some guidance (see inß-a Part IV(A)), but they
primarily involve parodies of a trademark which is not at issue here. For law review
commentary on the cases referred to in this footnote, see David C. Johnston, The Singer Did
Not Approve This Message: Analyzing the Unauthorized Use of Copyrighted Music in
Political Advertisements in Jackson Brown v. John McCain, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
687 (2010); Sarah Schacter, The Barracuda Lacuna: Music, Political Campaigns, and the
First Amendment, 99 GEO. L.J. 571 (Jan. 2011).
" Am. Family Life Ins. Co., 266 F.2d 682, 688 (citing Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 66, 687, 93
S.Ct. 2926, 37 L.Ecd.2d 873 (1973)). The other case the Hagan court referred to is
Mastercard v. Nader, supra note 36.
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Although Hagan was published in 2002, this remains true today.
There are a few obvious explanations why no cases are on point.
Practically, during each election cycle, the issue quickly becomes moot,
given that the debates typically occur right before an election is held. Any
subsequent ads containing debate footage usually run a few weeks, at most.
Also, and perhaps most importantly, despite the lack of relevant case law or
literature, the networks may know a losing argument when they see one. The
use of televised political debate footage in subsequent campaign advertising
is very likely an unequivocal fair use of the copyrighted material.^^
While no cases are directly on point regarding the fair use of campaign
debate footage, the literature has touched on the topic. A fair number of
recent articles have been published regarding the influence of the DMCA
take-down notice provision^' on political speech conveyed via the Internet,
an issue the McCain campaign faced in the general election in 2008.''"
Several of these articles describe the events of the 2008 campaign to argue
that application of the DMCA, as interpreted in the three hallmark cases
Online Policy Group v. Diebold,'" Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass'n of
America,''^ and Lenz v. Universal Music Corp.,^^ has resulted in an
unacceptable chilling effect on speech, to the detriment of the political
process. However, each of these articles simply (and correctly) assumes that
the use of debate footage in political campaign advertising is a fair use
without a thorough analysis of the issue.'*'' These authors have no doubt
See infra text accompanying notes 65-115. The term unequivocal fair use is borrowed from
Lenz V. Universal Music Corp., 572 F.Supp.2d 1150 (2008) ("One might imagine a case in
which an alleged infringer uses copyrighted material in a manner that unequivocally qualifies
as fair use . . .") and Jordan Koss, Note, Protecting Free Speech for Unequivocal Fair Users:
Rethinking Our Interpretation of the §512(F) Misrepresentation Clause, 28 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 149, 152-53 (2010) ("An unequivocal fair use means no reasonable copyright holder,
in evaluating an alleged infringer's use prior to issue a DMCA takedown notice, could
conclude that the use is anything but fair use under the four-factor test set out in 17 U.S.C. §
107. . . . In this evaluation, if the copyright holder's consideration of the four factors could
only come to one reasonable conclusion - that the use is fair - then this is an unequivocal fair
use.").
" Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006).
'"' See e.g., Charles W. Hazelwood, Jr., Fair Use and the Takedown / Put Back Provisions of
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 50 IDEA 307 (2010); Koss, supra note 38; Ian
Rubenstrunk, Comment, The Throw Down over Takedowns: An Analysis of the Lenz
Interpretation of 17 U.S.C. § 52I(F), 10 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. (Summer 2011);
Seltzer, Free Speech Unmoored in Copyright's Safe Harbor, supra note 12.
"' Online Policy Grp. v. Diebold, 337 F.Supp.2d 1195 (2004).
"^  Rossi V. Motion Picture Ass'n of Am., 391 F.3d 1000 (2004).
"^  Lenz V. Universal Music Corp., 572 F.Supp.2d 1150 (2008).
'^ For instance, DMCA scholar Wendy Seltzer states in her article. Free Speech Unmoored in
Copyright's Safe Harbor: Chilling Effects of the DMCA on the First Amendment, supra note
12, at 173, "[i]f there was ever a clear case of non-infringing fair use - speech protected by the
First Amendment - this should have been it: a political candidate, seeking to engage in public
40/Vol. XXIII/Southern Law Journal
made a valuable contribution to the growing body of work which advocates
changes to the takedown procedure of the DMCA so that important political
and social speech is not so easily removed from the public domain.
However, what is missing in the literature thus far is a detailed legal analysis
of the fair use argument as it applies to political speech containing debate
footage, an argument which must necessarily be made in any case which
challenges a network's refusal to allow campaign debate footage to be used
in any type of campaign advertising, via the Intemet or mn on television.
This paper fills that gap by providing such an analysis. The intention of this
paper is to give litigators and courts guidance and to direct further attention
to calls for a revision of the DMCA.
ni . COPYRIGHT PROTECTION AND FAIR USE
The purpose of copyright protection, which is found in Article I, § 8 of
the U.S. Constitution, is to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries.""^ Copyright protection
generally gives the holder an exclusive right to use the copyrighted material,
but over time courts began to recognize that a "rigid application of copyright
law could, in some situations, stifle the very artistic and scientific progress
that copyright protection is intended to protect.""* Thus, the common law
doctrine of fair use evolved as a defense to certain copyright infringement
claims."^ Congress codified fair use in 1976 to provide specific guidance
multimedia debate, used video snippets from the television programs on which the issues were
discussed." Similarly, Jordan Koss, in his article Protecting Free Speech for Unequivocal
Fair Users, supra note 38, at 153, states: "In the McCain example, the use fits squarely within
the four factors of 17 U.S.C. § 107, and since it is political speech, which is a 'time-sensitive
or controversial subject,' it deserves the highest protection under fair use principles (as
described by the Lenz court). This constitutes the epitome of unequivocal fair use." Even the
Campaign Takedown Troubles report, issued by the Center for Democracy and Technology,
dispenses with the fair use analysis in just one paragraph: "Based on available information, all
the incidents discussed below appear to be straightforward cases of fair use. The uses are
generally transformative: the targeted videos use footage from news broadcasts, originally
intended to inform, in ads or commentary intended to argue for a specific candidate or
position. As to the second factor, the footage at issue often involves factual reporting, which
is generally less protected by copyright than highly creative works. With respect to the third
factor, the videos typically incorporate only short segments of much longer broadcasts.
Finally, it is highly unlikely that the use of the clips has any bearing whatsoever on any market
for the original news broadcasts. And of course, all of these incidents involve political speech
and hence issues of public concem, which weighs in favor of fair use." Supra note 10, at 5.
"' U.S. CONST, art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
•** Johnston, supra note 36, at 691.
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regarding the type of secondary use that might be acceptable."^ The statute
allows for a fair use of copyrighted material "for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom
use), scholarship, or research.""' It is now commonly recognized that "the
purpose of copyright protection and that of the fair use exception are one in
the same; both seek to ensure that copyright law promotes the advancement
of art and science by restricting and permitting copies as appropriate."^"
Section 107 of the Copyright Act sets forth the following four factors
cotirts must apply to determine whether a secondary use of copyrighted
material is allowable as a fair use:
1. the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is.
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
2. the nature of the copyrighted work;
3. the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
4. the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.^'
Fair use must be determined on a case-by-case basis.^^ These four
factors must be considered together, in light of the fundamental purpose of
copyright law.^ ^ Part IV below discusses in detail the application of each of
these four factors to the unauthorized use of debate footage for purposes of
political speech.
Before considering these factors, however, the character of the
important expression involved in this case - political speech - necessitates a
discussion of whether and how free speech interests matter in copyright
infringement cases. This is especially true since the importance of free
speech in political campaigns is the frequent justification for the use of
debate footage in campaign advertising.^" After all, as the U.S. Supreme
Court recently reiterated in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,
the First Amendment "has its friUest and most urgent application to speech
uttered during a campaign for political office."'^ Political speech is
"indispensable to decision making in a democracy."^*
"'5ee 17 U.S.C. § 107(2006).
' Johnston, SMpranote 36, at 691.
'^ 17 U.S.C. §107(2006).
" Campbell v. Acuff, 510 U.S. 569, 578, 114 S.Ct. 1164 (1994).
" Id. at 577.
'^ See supra text accompanying notes 8-9 and 24.
" Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S.Ct. 876, 904 (2010).
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Despite the national significance of free speech issues, all courts that
have considered the matter have held that free speech is not a separate
defense in copyright infringement cases. "Multiple circuits have rejected a
First Amendment defense separate from the protections afforded by fair use,
holding that 'except perhaps in an extraordinary case, the fair use doctrine
encompasses all claims of first amendment in the copyright field.'"" For
example, in Roy Export v. CBS,^^ the Roy Export Co., which held the
copyrights to various Charlie Chaplin films, sued CBS after the network
broadcast a film biography of Chaplin which included clips from some of
those films. CBS claimed a First Amendment privilege to use the clips,
arguing that it was "meaningless to attempt a full account of his life without
making some use of the very things that make life worth remembering."^'
The court disagreed and noted that "[n]o Circuit that has considered the
question, however, has ever held that the First Amendment provides a
privilege in the copyright field distinct fi"om the accommodation embodied in
the 'fair use' doctrine."*"
The courts' refusal to extend free speech as a defense to a copyright
infringement claim is due in large part to the distinction between the right to
speak freely about an idea versus the competing right to protect one's exact
expression of that idea. This distinction is commonly referred to as the
"idea/expression dichotomy," as the U.S. Supreme Court explained in Eldred
V. Ashcroft:
[C]opyright law contains built-in First Amendment
accommodations. . . . First, it distinguishes between ideas and
expression and makes only the latter eligible for copyright
protection. . . . As we said in Harper & Row, this "idea/expression
dichotomy strike[s] a definitional balance between the First
Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free
communication of facts while still protecting an author's
expression." . . . Due to this distinction, every idea, theory, and fact
^' Johnston, supra note 36, at 704 (citing Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ'ns Intem., Ltd., 996
F.2d 1366, L378 (2nd Cir. L993)). See also, HustLer Magazine, Lnc. v. MoraL Majority, Lnc.
606 F.Supp. L526, L536 (U.S.D.C. Califomia 1985) ("[T]he first amendment does not provide
a defense to copyright infHngement.").
*^ Roy Exp. Co. Establishment of Vaduz, Liechtenstein v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 672
F.2d 1095 (L 982).
^'W. atL099.
'" Id. The court did note that there might be a First Amendment privilege to use copyrighted
material in "some 'rare,' 'almost unique' circumstance, such as those surrounding the
Zapruder film, m which 'it is at least arguable that the informational value of (the) film cannot
be separated from the photographer's expression, ... thereby indicating that both should be m
the public domain."' However, the court did not recognize such a privilege in this case. Id. at
lLOO.
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in a copyrighted work becomes instantly available for public
exploitation at the moment of publication."'
Over the years, several scholars have argued that free speech should be a
defense in certain copyright infringement cases. For instance, in an article
analyzing Mastercard v. Nader, ^ ^ one of the few cases involving copyright
and political speech, Eileen Hintz Rumfelt argued that:
[W]hen core political speech is implicated . . . courts should
analyze claims under First Amendment jurisprudence, which
focuses on the content of the message and the type of speech
involved. Under that analysis, core political speech gamers a high
degree of protection from those who seek to silence it.*^
David S. Olson also advocates for heightened scrutiny in copyright cases
involving issue of free speech:
[D]ue to the drastic lock-up of speech from increased copyright
coverage. First Amendment scrutiny must be applied to copyright
law with renewed vigor, and . . . in a number of areas,
accommodations must be made in copyright law to protect First
Amendment interests that are no longer adequately protected by
copyright law acting alone.*'*
In view of the ease with which copyright holders can have material removed
from the Intemet pursuant to the DMCA (described more fully in Part V
below), these arguments may have more pressing importance than they once
did. However, under the current state of the law, courts will not consider free
speech as a separate defense, but will simply incorporate free speech
" Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2002) (citations omitted).
" Mastercard v. Nader, 2004 WL 434404 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
'^ Eileen Hintz Rumfelt, Comment, Political Speech: Priceless - Mastercard v. Nader and
the Intersection of Intellectual Property and Free Speech, 55 EMORY L.J. 389, 391 (2006).
^ David S. Olson, First Amendment Interests and Copyright Accommodations, 50 B.C. L.
REV. 1393, 1397 (Nov. 2009). See also, Joseph P. Bauer, Copyright and the First
Amendment: Comrades, Combatants, or Uneasy Allies? 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 831, 837
(Summer 2010) ("The theme of this Article is not only that the First Amendment should play a
significant role in demarcating copyright protection, but that the courts and numerous
commentators have understated its significance."); Matthew D. Bunker, Adventures in the
Copyright Zone: The Puzzling Absence of Independent First Amendment Defenses in
Contemporary Copyright Disputes, 14 COMM. L. & POL'v 273, 292 (Summer 2009) ("Neither
the idea/expression dichotomy nor the fair use doctrine is adequate, either together or
separately, to protect First Amendment values in the copyright realm. Thus, it may be
appropriate to consider a new approach to this contested legal area.").
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considerations into the fair use defense and give them substantial weight, as
discussed more thoroughly in the next section.
rv. THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE APPLIED TO THE UNAUTHORIZED USE
OF CAMPAIGN DEBATE FOOTAGE
A. Factor One: Purpose and Character of the Use
A fair use analysis begins by looking at the purpose and character of the
secondary use of copyrighted material.*' This determination involves a
response to two fundamental questions. First, one must consider whether the
secondary use is commercial in nature.** Although not always dispositive, a
non-commercial use will weigh more favorably toward fair use than if the
alleged infiinger is using the original work for commercial purposes.*^ The
second step requires a determination of whether the secondary use can be
characterized as transformative.*^ Applied to the issue of debate footage
used in campaign advertising, this question of transformation is the most
important element of the entire fair use analysis.
The few courts which have considered this issue in the context of
political speech have consistently held that campaign advertising is not
commercial in nature. For instance, in American Family Life Insurance Co.
V. Hagan,^"^ the court considered a trademark violation claim in a case
involving a parody of the ubiquitous AFLAC duck, commonly shown in
American Family Life Assurance Company of Columbus (AFLAC)
television ads, in the 2002 Ohio gubernatorial race. Candidate Timothy
Hagan, whose opponent was incumbent Ohio Governor Robert Taft, created
campaign ads portraying a "TaftQuack" duck cartoon, which consisted of
Governor Taft's head on the body of a duck similar to the AFLAC duck.
AFLAC objected to the ad and filed a trademark violation claim against the
Hagan campaign. The Hagan court held that political campaign advertising,
even if done to solicit donations, is inherently non-commercial. "Hagan's
solicitation of contributions, and the making of those contributions by
visitors to the www.taftquack.com website, is much more than merely a
commercial transaction. Indeed, this exchange is properly classified not as a
commercial transaction at all, but completely noncommercial, political
speech."'"
" Consumers Union of United States, Inc., v. Gen. Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044 (1983).
" Lennon v. Premise Media Corp., L.P., 556 F.Supp.2d 310, 322 (2008).
69 Am. Family Life Ins. Co. v. Hagan, 266 F.Supp.2d 682 (2002).
Id at 691.
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Similarly, the district court in Mastercard v. Nader^^ relied upon Hagan
to hold that a campaign ad created by 2004 presidential candidate Ralph
Nader, which included a parody of the Mastercard "priceless" advertising
campaign, was non-commercial even though the ad sought political
donations. "This Court fmds that Ralph Nader's use of plaintiffs trademarks
is not commercial, but instead political in nature . . ."'^ In fact, the court
noted that any other holding could very well mean that all political speech
could be deemed commercial "since all political candidates collect
contributions."" Additionally, campaigns are arguably inherently non-profit
since federal law prohibits politicians from keeping money not spent on the
campaign.^"
This part of the character and purpose factor weighs strongly in favor of
a finding that use of political debate footage in a campaign ad is a fair use.
Campaign advertising is clearly non-commercial.^^ Hagan and Mastercard
support this conclusion.
Next, analysis of this first factor requires a look at whether the
secondary use is transformative. A second use of copyrighted material might
be transformative if it "adds something new, with a further purpose or
different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or
message."^* A transformative use might create "new information, new
" Mastercard v. Nader, 2004 WL 434404 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
" W . at 11.
Id. at 10. See also. Fed. Election Com'n v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533
U.S. 431, 440 (2001} ("Spending for political ends and contributing to political candidates
both fall within the First Amendment's protection of speech and political association"); Keep
Thomson Govemor Comm. v. Citizens for Gallen Comm., 457 F.Supp. 957, 961 (1978) ("The
use by the defendant of a portion of the plaintiff's political advertisement is clearly part of a
political campaign message, noncommercial in nature, and First Amendment issues of
freedom of expression in a political campaign are clearly implicated.").
''' Johnston, supra note 36, at 694.
The one case which has reached an opposite conclusion appears to be an anomaly. In
Henley v. DeVore, 733 F.Supp.2d 1144 (2010), the coun relied upon Worldwide Church of
God V. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2000), to hold that the use of two
of musician Don Henley's songs in campaign advertising was Indeed commercial. In
Worldwide Church, the Ninth Circuit held that monetary gain was not the sole criterion upon
which the commercial / non-commercial decision could be made in a fair use analysis. The
Henley court stated: "Like the church in Worldwide Church, which stood to gain parishioners
through the unlicensed use of the plaintiffs copyrighted work, [defendants] DeVore [the
candidate] and Hart [the campaign manager] stood to gain publicity and campaign donations
from their use of Henley's music. In fact, the videos contained links directing viewers to the
DeVore campaign website, encouraging them to donate. Thus, under the reasoning of
Worldwide Church, the Defendants 'profited' from their use by gaining an advantage without
having to pay customer licensing fees to the Plaintiffs. . . . In fact. Hart himself directly
profited, as his compensation was tied to the amount of ftmds he raised." Id. at 1159 (citations
omitted).
'* Campbell v. Acuff, 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994).
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aesthetics, new insights and understandings."^^ Additionally, to determine
whether the second use is transformative, one might ask whether it "[m]erely
supersede[s] the original work, or does it add something new, with a ftirther
purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression,
meaning, or message?"^^
Although First Amendment free speech rights are not a separate defense
to copyright law, clearly a secondary use of copyrighted material for
purposes of political speech must be given considerable weight, as the U.S.
District Court noted in the first iteration of the famous case. Hustler
Magazine v. Moral Majority, Inc. : "Although the first amendment does not
provide a defense to copyright infringement, when an act of copying occurs
in the course of a political, social or moral debate, the public interest in free
expression is one factor favoring a finding of fair use."^' Similarly, in Keep
Thomsen Governor v. Citizens for Gallen, which involved the use of a
copyrighted song in a political advertisement, the court noted that "the use by
the defendant of a portion of the plaintiffs political advertisement is clearly
part of a political campaign message, noncommercial in nature, and First
Amendment issues of freedom of expression in a political campaign are
clearly implicated." ^^
Looking at other fair use analyses of acceptable transformative uses,
such as critical social or cultural commentary,^' is also helpftil. An example
of a fair use for critical commentary is found in Savage v. Council on
American-Islamic Relations, Inc.^^ the facts of which parallel those
" Pierre N. Levai, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (Mar. 1990).
'* Campbell, 510 U.S. 569 at 578.
" Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 606 F.Supp. 1526, 1536 (U.S.D.C. Cal.,
1985). The decision in Hustler was affirmed on appeal in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral
Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148 (1986).
°^ Keep Thomsen Govemor Comm. v. Citizens for Gallen Comm., 457 F.Supp. 957, 961
(1978). See also, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2002); Nat'l Rifle Ass'n v. Handgun
Control Federation of Ohio, 15 F.3d 559, 562 (1994) ("The document was used primarily in
exercising HCF's First Amendment speech rights to comment on public issues... . The scope
of the fair use doctrine is wider when the use relates to issues of public concern."); Consumers
Union of United States, Inc. v. Gen. Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1050 (2nd Cir. 1983) ("The
scope of the docfrine [of fair use] is undoubtedly wider when the information conveyed relates
to matters of high public concern."); Lennon v. Premise Media Corp, 556 F.Supp.2d 310
(2008) ("Court are more willing to find a secondary use fair when it produces a value that
benefits the broader public interest... ").
" Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 11 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537 (Apr. 2009).
Professor Samuelson's article is a compelling, comprehensive attempt to organize, or bundle,
fair uses cases into certain patterns, or policy clusters, such as cases which implicate the
freedom of speech and expression interests of the authors and the public, which can be further
broken down into transformative, productive, and orthogonal uses.
*^  Savage v. Council on American-Islamic Relations, Inc., 2008 WL 2951281 (N.D.Cal.
2008).
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described in the introduction more closely than any other case. In Savage,
the Council on American-Islamic Relations of Santa Clara, Inc., (Council)
posted a page on its website, titled National Radio Host Goes On Anti-
Muslim Tirade, which included a four-minute audio clip taken from The
Savage Nation, a nationally-syndicated radio program hosted by Michael
Savage. The Council appropriated this material to criticize many of Savage's
"anti-Muslim" statements, which often equated Muslims with terrorists, and
to raise money for its cause. Savage sued the Council for copyright
infringement, claiming that its unauthorized use of portions of his show was
taken out of context and that the "'misportrayals' destroyed the value of his
material and led to a loss of advertising revenue."^^
The court disagreed with Savage. Considering the purpose of the
Council's use of Savage's remarks, the court found the use to be fair in part
because it provided authenticity. The court held that:
To comment on plaintiffs statements without reference or citation
to them would not only render defendants' criticism less reliable,
but be unfair to plaintiff. Further, it was not unreasonable for
defendants to provide the actual audio excerpts, since they
reaffirmed the authenticity of the criticized statements and provided
the audience with the tone and manner in which the plaintiff made
the statements. '^*
The Savage court relied upon the Ninth Circuit case of Hustler v. Moral
Majority^^ to support its holding that the Council had made a fair use of the
Sayage video. Hustler concemed the infamous parody of Jerry Falwell in a
Campari ad which ran in an edition of Hustler Magazine. Falwell and his
organization, the Moral Majority, responded to the ad by mailing a copy of it
in a flindraising appeal to its membership, in part because "words were
inadequate to illustrate how outrageous the ad was."^* Hustler then sued the
Moral Majority, claiming that the organization's use of the ad in its
flindraising letter infringed on Hustler's copyright. The Moral Majority
claimed that the letter was fair use, and the court agreed:
Falwell was not selling the parody, but was instead using the
parody to make a statement about pomography and Larry Flynt, the
publisher of Hustler. Section 107 expressly permits fair use for the
purposes of criticism and comment. . . . [A]n individual in rebutting
Id. at 2.
Id. at 5.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d L L48 (L986).
Samuelson, supra note 81, at L L.
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a copyrighted work containing derogatory information about
himself may copy such parts of the work as are necessary to permit
understandable comment. Falwell did not use more than was
reasonably necessary to make an understandable comment when he
copied the entire parody from the magazine. Therefore, the public
interest in allowing an individual to defend himself against such
derogatory personal attacks serves to rebut the presumption of
unfaimess.^'
An earlier case. Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates, ^ ^ is also relevant.
The Geis court considered whether Time, Inc., could successfully defend its
copyright on the Zapmder film depicting the assassination of President
Kennedy against the publisher of a book on the topic. The court mied
against Time, Inc., and held that the use of still photos of the Zapmder film
was a fair use, in part because of the national importance of the film's
content.
There is a public interest in having the fullest information available
on the murder of President Kennedy. Thompson did serious work
on the subject and has a theory entitled to public consideration.
While doubtless the theory could be explained with sketches of the
type used at page 87 of the Book and in the Saturday Evening Post,
the explanation actually made in the Book with copies is easier to
understand. The Book is not bought because it contained the
Zapmder pictures; the Book is bought because of the theory of
Thompson and its explanation, supported by Zapmder pictures.^^
Application of this part of the first factor to campaign ads containing
debate footage also weighs in favor of a finding of fair use. First, because
these ads contain political speech relating to a matter of high public concem,
the use is entitled to a great deal of latitude as a fair use defense.'" Moreover,
the use of debate footage in campaign advertising is inherently
" Hustler Magazine, Inc., 796 F.2d at 1153.
*' Time, Inc., v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F.Supp. 130 (1968).
*' Id. at 146. The court went on to state: "There seems little, if any, injury to plaintiff, the
copyright owner. There is no competition between plaintiff and defendants. Plaintiff does not
sell the Zapruder pictures as such and no market for the copyrighted work appears to be
affected. Defendants do not publish a magazine. There are projects for use by plaintiff of the
film in the future as a motion picture or in books, but the effect of the use of certain frames in
the Book on such projects is speculative. It seems more reasonable to speculate that the Book
would, if anything, enhance the value of the copyrighted work; it is difficult to see any
decrease in its value." Id.
'" Consumers Union, Inc., v. Gen. Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1050 (1983). See also, supra
text accompanying notes 79-80.
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transformative because it serves a different purpose than the original work."
The point of these ads is political advocacy, while the original work is
intended to be informational.'^ As each of these ads is described, the debate
footage was inserted into the ad to persuade viewers to vote for a particular
candidate by criticizing his opponent and questioning the opponent's
qualifications for the position.'^ This indicates that the second use was
clearly a transformation of the first, serving a different function.
Additionally, as in Savage, the use of the IPTV video in the political ad was
to "reaffirm the authenticity of the statements" and to provide the audience
with the veracity of what was said. Melaleuca CEO VanderSloot stated that
the actual debate footage was used in the ad to make clear what Olson had
said. "We could have said what he said but then no one would believe it. . . .
We thought it was important to put it up there in his own words."'''
B. Factor Two: Nature of the Copyrighted Work
Here, courts will look at the nature of the original work by considering two
separate questions. First, is the original work informational or creative? Fair
use is generally more acceptable regarding informational rather than creative
'^ Second, has the original work been published? A secondary use of
This is especially true in the Idaho Public Television case in which the debate footage was
literally transformed, at least in parts, by the addition of music, a voice-over, and changing the
speed of the footage. See Gray, supra note 20.
' See Campaign Takedown Troubles, supra note 10, at 5 ("The targeted videos use footage
from news broadcasts, originally intended to inform, in ads or commentary intended to argue
for a specific candidate or position.").
'^ At one point in the Idaho ad containing the IPTV debate footage, the voice-over states,
"Administrators should know and understand what's taught within our schools. ... That may
disqualify Stan Olson." See Russell, supra note 18.
''' Id. VanderSloot also stated, "We'd like people to just watch the whole debate, but of course
you can't show the whole debate in a 60 second spot, so we wanted to bring some of the
attention on that race, and we thought that those comments that we show are quite important
for people to know." Grey, supra note 20. See also. Campaign Takedown Troubles, supra
note 10, at 10 ("The clips are used to fact check and contrast [the candidate's] claims during a
. . . debate with her statements during a Washington Policy center annual dinner, a journalistic
critique that simply would not be possible without the use of these clips.") (quoting from
David Goldstein, Suzie Hearts Huckabee (and Lies About It), HA SEATTLE BLOG, (Oct. 29,
2009), http://horsesass.org/?p=21598).
'^ Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563, 105 S.Ct. 2218, 2232
(1985) ("The law generally recognizes a greater need to disseminate factual works than works
of fiction or fantasy.") See also. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d
1148, 1153-54 (9th Cir. 1986) ("The scope of fair use is greater when 'informational' as
opposed to more 'creative' works are involved.").
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work that has been published is more likely to be considered a fair use than if
the work is not yet available to the public.'*
This factor needs little analysis as it weighs so clearly in favor of fair
use.'' The nature of the copyrighted work itself, a political debate, is clearly
informational. This may be especially true regarding non-profit networks
such as IPTV. The IPTV website states, in part, that its mission is "to meet
the needs and reflect the interests of our various audiences by . . . [p]roviding
teaming opportunities and fostering participation and collaboration in
education and civic activities."'^ Likewise, a spokesperson for the League of
Women Voters of Idaho who helped organize the IPTV debate stated, "[w]e
do these [debates] as part of our voter-education effort . . . " " Secondly, it
almost goes without saying that the original work (the debate) will be
televised before the campaign ad is released (indeed that is the source of the
clip included in the ad). Thus, the question of publication is not relevant.
C. Factor Three: Amount and Substantiality of the Work Used
This factor requires both a quantitative analysis, which examines how
much of the original expression is used in the secondary work, and a
qualitative analysis, which looks at the significance of the borrowed portion
of the original work.'"" According to Savage, "[t]his factor looks to the
quantity and significance of the material used to determine whether the use is
reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose of the defendant's work and
whether it supersedes or constitutes the heart of the original work."'"'
However, "[t]here is no clear standard to this test, and courts have rejected
absolute mies regarding what proportion is too much to possibly be
considered fair use, and what proportion is so insignificant that it must be fair
use."'"'
'* See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564 ("[T]he author's right to control the first public
appearance of his expression weighs against such use of the work before its release. The right
of first publication encompasses not only the choice whether to publish at all, but also the
choices of when, where, and in what form first to publish a work.").
" Indeed, at least one law review article on this topic omitted this factor completely from its
discussion because the original work under analysis had been published. 5ee Johnston, supra
note 36, at 693 ("The analysis omits the second consideration, the nature of the copyrighted
work, because it exists to protect unpublished materials and is irrelevant here.").
'* Idaho Public Television Mission, http://idahoptv.org/about/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2012).
" Russell, supra note 18.
""* Johnston, supra note 36.
"" Savage v. Council on American-Islamic Relations, Inc., 2008 WL 2951281 at 5 (N.D.Cal.
2008). See also, Campbell v. Acuff, 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994); Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v.
Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622 (2003); Sofa Entm't, Inc. v. Dodger Prods., Inc., 2010 WL
4228343 (D.C.Cal. 2010).
'"^  Johnston, supra note 36, at 696.
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Application of this factor also supports a fair use mling. In Savage, the
video published on the Council's website involved four minutes of a two-
hour talk show, which the court considered to be insubstantial:
As discussed in the Court's analysis of the first fair use factor,
defendants used the audio excerpts to comment on and rebut
derogatory statements regarding their organization and their
religious affiliations, and the amount used in reference to plaintiffs
statements was reasonably necessary to convey the extent of
plaintiffs comments. As a result, regardless of whether the entire
October 29, 2007, program or segments of that program constitute
the entire original work for analysis under this factor, the extent of
defendants' copying of the audio excerpts falls within the fair use
doctrine.'"^
While the national campaign ads described in this article's introduction
are not available for viewing, various sources describe them as using a very
small portion of the debates from which they are taken. For instance,
Romney's ad uses only a "snippet of the 90 minute coverage of the debate
between the candidates."'^" A similar McCain ad used just 19 seconds of a
90 minute debate aired on Fox News.'"^ In the IPTV case, while the 60-
second Melaleuca ad consisted of 45 seconds of campaign debate footage,
the debate itself was an hour long. Moreover, the portion of the footage used
compared to the entire debate itself, while not miniscule, is certainly not the
crux of the debate. Indeed, no portion of a political debate is arguably of any
greater importance than any other. Consequently, the amount and importance
of the original work used in these political campaign ads weighs against the
networks and in favor of a finding of fair use.
D. Factor Four: Effect on the Market for the Original Work
The fourth factor, the effect of the second use on the market for the
original work, is typically considered to be the most important in fair uses
cases.'"^ Many courts rejecting a fair use defense do so because of the
"" Savage, 2008 WL 2951281 at 6.
'"'' See Sargent, supra note 7; New Romney Ad Uses Fox Debate Video; THE CAUCUS - THE
POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT BLOG OF THE N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2,1007),
http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/ll/02/new-romney-ad-uses-fox-debate-video/.
'"^  Jim Rutenberg, Fox Orders Halt to McCain Ad, THE CAUCUS - THE POLITICS AND
GOVERNMENT BLOG OF THE N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25,2007),
http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/10/25/fox-ordera-halt-to-mccain-ad/.
'"* Consumers Union, Inc., v. Gen. Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1050 (1983) ("This factor is
'widely accepted to be the most important.'") (citation omitted); Johnston, supra note 36, at
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adverse impact of the second use on the market for the original work.
Although arguably the first factor is the most persuasive in this particular fair
use analysis, as explained previously in section IV(A), this fourth factor is
significant. Indeed, it too weighs in favor of a fair use conclusion because
the impact on the market for the original work is minimal, at best.
Under this fourth factor, courts look at the extent to which the secondary
use tends to diminish potential sales of the original work or interferes with
the marketability of the original work by fulfilling demand for it.'"'
Generally, courts will compare the:
[B]enefit the public will derive if the use is permitted [against] the
personal gain the copyright owner will receive if the use is
denied. . . . The less adverse effect that an alleged infringing use
has on the copyright owner's expectation of gain, the less public
benefit need be shown to justify the use.'"*
Courts will find against fair use if the secondary use is found to compete
directly with the copyrighted work, as was the case in Harper & Row. '"' In
that case, publishing company Harper & Row, which held the copyright to
President Ford's memoirs, sued the publisher of The Nation magazine after it
published portions of the memoirs without permission. Harper had
previously contracted with Time Magazine to mn a series excerpting the
memoirs. After The Nation's article ran. Time canceled its piece and its
payment to Harper. In Harper, as is typical, this fourth factor was significant.
The court held that The Nation's subsequent use of the material competed
directly with the proposed articles Time was to have run and thus reduced its
market, which in tum damaged Harper, the copyright holder. In fact, the
court noted that "[r]arely will a case of copyright infringement present such
clear-cut evidence of actual damage."""
Conversely, "courts weigh this consideration in favor of fair use when
the use would have zero impact or a positive impact on the market for the
copyrighted work."'" This was the case in Savage, where the court noted
that:
There is no suggestion that plaintiff currently has, or ever had, any
kind of market for the copyrighted work at issue outside its airing
698 ("The Supreme Court has called this 'undoubtedly the single most important element of
fair use' and the 'most important, and indeed, central fair use factor.'").
"" Lennon v. Premise Media Corp., L.P., 556 F.Supp.2d 310, 327 (2008).
'"' MCA, Lnc, V. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 183 (L981).
"" Harper & Row, 471 U.S. 539, 105 S.Ct. 2218 (1985).
""W. at 567.
' ' ' Johnston, supra note 36, at 699.
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on the ... radio show. Further, he does not allege any attempts or
plans to sell or license the material or derivatives thereof. Plaintiff
instead alleges that defendants caused him financial loss in
advertising revenue. Assuming the truth of this allegation, it relates
only to the economic impact on future shows, and has no impact on
the market for the original, copyrighted show. . . . Because this
factor limits the evaluation of market impact to the original work at
issue, not other works by the creator, the loss of advertising
revenue for future shows, unrelated to the original work, does not
give rise to a legal cognizable infringement claim. "^
Similarly, in Hustler, the court noted that the magazine which contained
the excerpts used in the Moral Majority's mailing was no longer on the
newsstands and available for purchase. Thus, the court held that the effect of
the secondary use on the marketability of back issues was minimal, which
supported a conclusion that the use was legitimate."'
Although there are no statements from the networks regarding the actual
financial impact of campaign ads containing debate footage, it is hard to
imagine that there would be significant monetary consequences."'' As in
Savage, there is no indication of a market for these televised debates outside
of their original airing. As The Center for Democracy and Technology
(CDT) points out in the brief fair use discussion in its Campaign Takedown
Troubles report:
On the fourth factor - the effect on the potential market or value of
the copyrighted work - the use of seven seconds of footage from a
news broadcast, well after airing, certainly had no conceivable
effect on the market for that broadcast. The initial screening of the
broadcast is the primary commercial market for each day's CBS
Evening News. Use of the clip did not deprive the copyright owner
of income or undermine a new or potential market for licensing
revenues. Further, the mere use of a short clip as a basis for
"^ Savage, 2008 WL 2951281 at 6-7.
' ' ' Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1986). See also.
Mastercard v Nader, 2004 WL 434404 at 16 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("The Ralph Nader Political Ad
may serve a general overlapping market, the viewing public. However, it serves an entirely
different purpose than the Priceless Advertisements, a political non-commercial purpose. For
this reason, the fourth factor also weighs heavily in the defendant's favor for a fmding of fair
use."); Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am. v. Handgun Control Fed'n of Ohio, 15 F.3d 559 (1994).
' '"* Indeed, this may be especially true in the Idaho case, given that IPTV is not a for-profit
news organization, which is different than the major television networks such as Fox News.
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political advocacy would not diminish the audience or fulfill
demand for any re-airing of the original program."^
Thus, while this is often the most important factor in those cases in
which courts find against a secondary use being fair, in this case it weighs
heavily in favor of a fair use. There is no market for campaign debate
footage after the debate has aired.
E. Fair Use Summary
In conclusion, the secondary use of televised campaign debate footage
in political advertising does not infringe upon the networks' copyright
protection. Such use is allowable under the fair use doctrine and serves an
important public purpose. It is both non-commercial and transformative in
nature. The amount of debate material used in a campaign ad is likely to be
minor compared to the length of the televised debate. Finally, the use of the
debate footage is unlikely to have any adverse impact on the potential market
for the original work, if indeed one exists.
A fair use holding would lUcely resolve any dispute regarding campaign
ads run on national television; it would almost certainly resolve the Idaho
case. This is due in large part to the burden placed on copyright holders to
enforce their rights in court when their protected material is aired on
television. "[T]o get an allegedly infi-inging work removed in non-digital
copyright cases, a copyright holder has to seek an injunction in court,""*
which no network appears to have done (or may be likely to do). However,
campaign advertising has also transitioned to the digital milieu, where the
legal landscape is vastly different. The DMCA shifts the balance of power
regarding copyright enforcement to the copyright holders by giving them the
right to issue take-down notices to any ISP who is host to allegedly
infringing material."^ This event has occurred numerous times in recent
years to candidates who have used debate footage in ads posted on the
Internet."^ Thus, the DMCA must be addressed as well.
"^ See, Campaign Takedown Troubles, supra note 10, at 6.
' '* Hazelwood, supra note 40, at 307 ("The copyright holder is free to send a takedown notice
for cases of questionable infringement, de minimis infringement, or in clear cases of fair use.
This is in sharp contrast to the incentive in non-digital copyright cases. In order to get an
allegedly infringing work removed in non-digital copyright cases, a copyright holder has to
seek an injunction in court. This procedure necessarily involves legal expenses. These
expenses act as an economic disincentive on copyright holders to pursue cases of de minims
infringement or cases where there is an arguable fair use right.").
' '* See supra text accompanying note 16.
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V. FAIR USE AND THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT (DMCA)
A holding that the use of political debate footage in campaign
advertising is a fair use of that copyrighted material will have especially
important relevance in cases involving the DMCA."' In stark contrast to the
networks' reluctance to enforce their copyrights when these ads are run on
television, some networks, especially Fox News, have vigorously enforced
their copyright protection regarding material posted on the Intemet because
their right to do so under the DMCA is dramatically different than it is in
non-digital cases. The Center for Democracy and Technology states:
When a campaign receives a cease-and-desist letter, it can evaluate
the strength of its legal position and determine whether it should
pull the ad. . . . By contrast, when a takedown demand is issued
against an online user-generated content platform like YouTube,
the ad comes down promptly and virtually automatically, for a
minimum of two weeks. Online ads can be taken down vktually at
will because the DMCA provides intermediaries strong incentives
not to second-guess takedown requests.'^"
Other scholars who have analyzed the relevant DMCA cases have concluded
they have resulted in an unacceptable chilling of important political
speech.'^'
A. The DMCA and Relevant Case Law
In the 1990s, as the digital transmission of copyrighted material grew
widespread on the Intemet, Congress recognized the necessity of limiting
liability for copyright infringement for Intemet service providers (ISPs) who
provided an Intemet site through which others could post content.'^^
Congress enacted the DMCA in 2006 in part to "protect[] intemet service
providers from copyright infringement claims and copyright owners against
' "17 U.S.C. §512(2006).
'^ ^ See Campaign Takedown Troubles, supra note 10, at 15.
'^' See Infra text accompanying notes 190-92 .
'^ ^ Rubenstrunk, supra note 40, at 796 ("In passing the DMCA, Congress recognized that the
law struggled to keep up with the fast-paced development of new technology and recognized
that the law needed to adapt to new changes. The DMCA was designed to create an
environment where electronic commerce and digital technology could advance and flourish
globally. Congress hoped to make digital networks safe places to disseminate and make use of
copyrighted materials and make available to the public 'the ftuit of American genius.' In
creating this piece of legislation. Congress conducted extensive research and sought a broad
spectrum of viewpoints to ensure that they could protect the interests of all intemet users and
copyright holders.").
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piracy by providing means for copyright owners to have infringing material
immediately removed from the Intemet."'^^ Section 512(c), commonly
referred to as the safe harbor provision of the DMCA,'^" grants immtinity
from a possible copyright infringement claim to an ISP that passively stores
or hosts material posted by others, if it is unaware that infringing material has
been posted and "acts expeditiously to disable access to [infringing] material
upon notice of the alleged infringement by the copyright owner."'^^
Section 512(c) also places certain requirements on copyright holders
who issue takedown notices to ISPs. The notice must include "[a] statement
that the complaining party has a good faith belief that the use of the material
in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its
agent, or the law."'^* Once the ISP removes material pursuant to a copyright
holder's take-down notice, the user who posted the allegedly infringing
material is given an opportunity to defend the use by providing a counter-
notice to the ISP that the secondary use was made in good faith and that the
original take-down notice was the result of a "mistake or
misidentification."'^' The ISP is then obligated to notify the copyright holder
of the user's counter-notice and replace the material within ten to fourteen
days of receipt of the counter-notice, unless the copyright holder files an
infringement lawsuit within that time frame.'^^ Section 512(f) provides a
cause of action to parties who suffer damages as a result of a copyright
holder's violation of § 512(c), i.e. who knowingly misrepresent a claim of
copyright infringement in a takedown notice.'^' "The purpose of Section
512(f) is to prevent the abuse of takedown notices."''"'
'^ ^ Hazelwood, supra note 40, at 309.
'^ ^ Online Policy Grp. v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F.Supp.2d 1195, 1200-01 (N.D.Cal. 2004) ("[The]
DMCA contains various nonexclusive safe harbors designed to limit the liability of ISPs for
incidental acts of copyright infringements.").
'^ ^ See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)-(d). Those circumstances include providing Intemet access, system
caching or temporary storage of material, passive storage or hosting of material posted by
others, and providing location tools.
'^ * Id. at § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) ("To be effective under this subsection, a notification of claimed
infringement must be a written communication provided to the designated agent of a service
provider that includes substantially the following:.. . (v) A statement that the complaining
party has a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not
authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law.") (emphasis added).
'^' Id. at § 512(g)(3)(c) ("To be effective under this subsection, a counter notification must be
a written communication provided to the service provider's designated agent that Includes
substantially the following:... A statement under penalty of perjury that the subscriber has a
good faith belief that the material was removed or disabled as a result of mistake or
misidentification of the material to be removed or disabled.") (emphasis added).
Id. at § 512(f) ("Any person who knowingly materially misrepresents under this section ...
(1) that material or activity is infringing, or (2) that material or activity was removed or
disabled by mistake or misidentification, shall be liable for any damages, including costs and
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Since the DMCA was enacted, copyright owners have issued thousands
of take-down notices pursuant to § 512(c).'^' However, to date, very few
cases on the relevant provisions of the DMCA have been published. Three
of these cases are relevant to this issue and have been widely discussed:
Online Policy Group v. Diebold,^^^ Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass 'n of America,
Inc., '•'^  and Lenz v. Universal Music Corp.^^'^
Diebold was the first case in which a court applied the language of §
512(f) of the DMCA which assigns liability to copyright holders who
knowingly misrepresent a copyright infringement in a take-down notice.
Diebold, Inc., manufactures electronic voting machines which were the
subject of much criticism after the 2004 elections. Two students at
Swarthmore College obtained an archive of Diebold employee emails which
allegedly contained evidence that Diebold was aware of problems with its
machines before the election. These students posted the information on
various websites through an ISP provided by Swarthmore. Diebold
subsequently sent the students, Swarthmore, and the ISP a takedown notice
demanding the removal of the archive. The students took the material down
and subsequently filed a lawsuit against Diebold, alleging that "Diebold's
claim of copyright infringement was based on knowing material
misrepresentation" in violation of § 512(f) of the DMCA. The basis of their
claim was that posting the email archive was a lawful use of the material
under the fair use defense to copyright infringement.'^^
The court first considered whether the plaintiffs' use of the email
archive was a fair use of the material.
The purpose, character, nature of the use, and the effect of the use
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work all
indicate that at least part of the email archive is not protected by
copyright law. The email archive was posted or hyperlinked to for
the purpose of informing the public about the problems associated
with Diebold's electronic voting machines. It is hard to imagine a
subject the discussion of which could be more in the public interest.
attomeys' fees, incurred by the alleged infringer, by any copyright owner or copyright owner's
authorized licensee, or by a service provider, who is injured by such misrepresentation, as the
result of the service provider relying upon such misrepresentation in removing or disabling
access to the material or activity claimed to be infringing, or in replacing the removed material
or ceasing to disable access to it.") (emphasis added).
''" Lenz V. Universal, 572 F.Supp.2d 1150, L L56 (N.D.Cal. 2008).
'^' Hazelwood, supra note 40, at 325.
' " Online Policy Grp. v. Diebold, 337 F.Supp.2d L195 (N.D.Cal. 2004).
' " Rossi V. Motion Picture Ass'n of Am., Lnc, 391 F.3d LOOO (9th Cir. 2004).
' " Lenz V. UniversaL Music Corp, 572 F.Supp.2d L L50, L156 (N.D.Cal. 2008).
'^ ^ Diebold, 337 F.Supp.2d at L L98.
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If Diebold's machines in fact do tabulate voters' preferences
incorrectly, the very legitimacy of elections would be suspect.
Moreover, Diebold has identified no specific commercial purpose
or interest affected by publication of the email archive, and there is
no evidence that such publication actually had or may have any
affect on the putative market value, if any, of Diebold's allegedly
copyrighted material. Even if it is true that portions of the email
archive have commercial value, there is no evidence that plaintiffs
have attempted or intended to sell copies of the email archive for
profit. . . . Finally, Plaintiffs' and [the ISP's] use was
transformative; they used the email archive to support criticism that
is in the public interest, not to develop electronic voting
technology. Accordingly, there is no genuine issue of material fact
that Diebold, through its use of the DMCA, sought to and did in
fact suppress publication of content that is not subject to copyright
protection.'^*
Finding that the use was lawful, the court then considered whether
Diebold knowingly and materially misrepresented that the use violated its
copyright. At issue was the parties' disagreement about the meaning of the
requirement of § 512(f) that the allegation of copyright infringement be
"knowingly materially misrepresented."'" Regarding the appropriate
definition, the court stated:
A requirement that a party have an objectively measured
"likelihood of success on the merits" in order to assert claims of
copyright infringement would impermissibly chill the rights of
copyright owners. . . . A party is liable if it "knowingly" and
"materially" misrepresents that copyright infringement has
occurred. "Knowingly" means that a party actually knew, should
have known if it acted with reasonable care or diligence, or would
have had no substantial doubt had it been acting in good faith, that
it was making misrepresentations.'^^
Based upon its analysis that the plaintiffs clearly made a fair use which
did not infringe upon Diebold's copyright protection, the court held that
Diebold's claim of copyright infringement in its take-down notice was a
knowing misrepresentation of the DMCA.
'^Vi/, at 1203.
'^' Id. at 1204. See also, supra text accompanying notes 129-130.
'^ * Id. at 1204. See infra note 149 for discussion about the relationship between Diebold and
Rossi.
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Applying this standard and in light of the evidence in the record,
the court concludes as a matter of law that Diebold knowingly
materially misrepresented that Plaintiffs infiinged Diebold's
copyright interest, at least with respect to the portions of the email
archive clearly subject to the fair use exceptions. No reasonable
copyright holder could have believed that the portions of the email
archive discussing possible technical problems with Diebold's
voting machines were protected by copyright, and there is no
genuine issue of fact that Diebold knew - and indeed that it
specifically intended - that its letters to OPG and Swarthmore
would result in prevention of publication of that content. The
misrepresentations were material in that they resulted in removal of
the content from websites and the initiation of the present lawsuit.
The fact that Diebold never actually brought suit against any
alleged infringer suggests strongly that Diebold sought to use the
DMCA's safe harbor provisions - which were designed to protect
ISPs, not copyright holders - as a sword to suppress publication of
embarrassing content rather than as a shield to protect its
intellectual property.'^'
Although the Diebold court suggested that the applicable standard for
determining whether a misrepresentation was made knowingly might be
objective ("[kjknowingly means that a party ... should have known if it acted
with reasonable care . . ."), the court in Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass'n of
America held affirmatively that it was not. Plaintiff Michael Rossi
maintained a website ("intemetmovies.com") which he described as an
"online magazine" intended to provide users with a directory through which
they could find online movies.'''" Although Rossi claimed that movies could
not actually be downloaded through his site, various links found on the site
indicated that movies were "downloadable" by clicking on the link.''" The
Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), a trade association
comprised of movie studios organized to protect and enforce its members'
copyrights, viewed the website and subsequently served both Rossi and his
website's ISP with a take-down notice pursuant to § 512(c)(3) of the
DMCA.'"^ The MPAA did not ascertain whether movies were available for
download by actually clicking on the site's links.'''^ Although Rossi
subsequently found a new ISP to host his site, he filed suit against the MPAA
'"/£?. at 1204-05.
'""Rossi, 391 F.3dat 1002.
'"' Id.
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alleging, among other claims, that the MPAA violated § 512(c) of the
DMCA by issuing its take-down notice without a good faith belief that Rossi
had actually infringed upon any of the copyrights held by MPAA
members.'"" The district court granted the MPAA's motion for summary
• I 145
judgment.
On appeal, the issue before Ninth Circuit was whether the good faith
belief requirement of § 512(c)(3)(A) of the DMCA should be evaluated upon
an objective or subjective standard. The court referred to the language in §
512(c) ("good faith belief), § 512(f) ("knowingly materially represents"),
and similar language found in other federal statutes to conclude that the
DMCA contemplated a subjective standard requiring the copyright holder's
actual knowledge that the secondary use does not infringe:
Juxtaposing the "good faith" proviso of the DMCA with the
"knowing misrepresentation" provision of that same statute reveals
an apparent statutory structure that predicated the imposition of
liability upon copyright owners only for knowing
misrepresentations regarding allegedly infringing websites.
Measuring compliance with a lesser "objective reasonableness"
standard would be inconsistent with Congress's apparent intent that
the statute protect potential violators from subjectively improper
actions by copyright owners.'"*
The court rejected outright an interpretation which would hold copyright
owners liable for even unreasonable mistakes regarding claims of
infringement. "A copyright owner cannot be liable simply because an
unknowing mistake is made, even if the copyright owner acted unreasonably
in making the mistake."'"^ Applying this subjective standard to the MPAA's
take-down notice, the court held it did not violate the DMCA. Given the
website's "unequivocal language" that movies were available for download,
the court determined that that the MPAA had concluded "in good faith that
motion pictures owned by MPAA members were available for immediate
downloading from the website. The unequivocal language used by Rossi not
only suggests that conclusion, but virtually compels it."'"^ The court upheld
' ""« .a t 1004.
'"'W. at 1003.
'"*/rf. at 1005 (emphasis in original).
'"'W. at 1005.
'"' Id. at 1006-07 ("After one of the MPAA's member companies notified the MPAA's anti-
piracy department of possible infringements on intemetmovies.com, an MPAA employee
reviewed the website. The website contained statements that included 'Join to download full
length movies online now! New movies every month'; 'Full Length Downloadable Movies';
and 'NOW DOWNLOADABLE.' These representations on the website led the MPAA
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the district court's decision to grant the MPAA's motion for summary
judgment.
Lenz V. Universal Music Corp followed Rossi approximately four years
later and considered the fair use defense to interpretation of the DMCA. The
facts of Lenz have been widely-discussed.'^" In February, 2007, plaintiff
Stephanie Lenz videotaped her young child dancing to the Prince song Let's
Go Crazy and uploaded the 29-second video on YouTube to share with her
family and friends. The video was of apparent low quality, and only
approximately 20 seconds of it contained audible portions of the song.'^'
Nonetheless, Universal Music Corporation, which holds the copyright to the
song, sent YouTube a take-down notice pursuant to the DMCA in June,
2007, approximately five months after Lenz uploaded it.'^ ^ YouTube
immediately removed the video and notified Lenz that it had done so. Lenz
employee to conclude in good faith that motion pictures owned by MPAA members were
available for immediate downloading from the website. The unequivocal language used by
Rossi not only suggests that conclusion, but virtually compels it. As the district court noted,
'[t]here is little question that these statements strongly suggest, if not expressly state, that
movies were available for downloading from the site.' ... In fact, Rossi even admitted that his
own customers often believed that actual movies were available for downloading on his
website.") (footnotes and citations omitted).
'•" The relationship between the Diebold and Rossi decisions remains in question. In an
earlier decision in the Lenz v. Universal case, which is discussed in the next paragraph. Judge
Fogel made the following statement: "While Diebold was decided prior to Rossi, the cases are
not necessarily in conflict. Diebold is distinguishable based on its facts; although it included a
takedown of hundreds of emails, the defendant failed to identify any specific emails
containing copyrighted content, and it appeared to acknowledge that at least some of the
emails were subject to the fair use doctrine. Here, it is undisputed that the song 'Let's Go
Crazy' is copyrighted, and Universal does not concede that the posting is a fair use. Under
Rossi, there must be a showing of a knowing misrepresentation on the part of the copyright
owner." See, Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 2008 WL 962102 at 3 (N.D.Cal. 2008).
Additionally, Matthew Schonauer suggests that other courts have followed Rossi, but he also
goes on to state that, "[t]he case law history regarding the application of § 512(f) by end users
seeking protection from abusive, erroneous, or disruptive DMCA notices therefore
demonstrates that the issue is far from settled in most circuits, having only appeared at issue
before the judiciary in the Second, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits. It also suggests that
the precise requirements for a finding of liabilify under § 512(f) may have a shaky
foundation." See Matthew Schonauer, Note, Let the Babies Dance: Strengthening Fair Use
and Stifling Abuse in DMCA Notice and Takedown Procedures, 11/S: J.L. & POL'Y FOR INFO.
Soc'Y 135, 151 (Winter 2011).
'^ ^ See, e.g., Mareasa M. Fortunato, Note, Let's Not Co Crazy: Why Lenz v. Universal Music
Corp. Undermines the Notice and Takedown Process of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,
17 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 147 (Fall 2009); Joseph M. Miller, Note, Fair Use Through the Lenz of
§ 512(C) of the DMCA: A Preemptive Defense to a Premature Remedy?, 95 IOWA L. REV.
1697 (July 2010); Schonauer, supra note 149; Benjamin Wilson, Comment, Notice,
Takedown, and the Good-Faith Standard: How to Protect Internet Users from Bad-faith
Removal of Web Content, 29 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 613, 629 (2010).
'^' Lenz, 572 F.Supp.2d at 1152.
' "
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filed a counter-notice, asserting that her video was a fair use of the song.
YouTube reposted the video approximately six weeks after receiving her
counter-notice.'" Lenz subsequently filed suit against Universal, claiming
that its takedown notice violated the DMCA. Her complaint alleged that
Universal could not have had a good faith belief that her video was a
copyright infringement because she had made a legitimate fair use of the
song.'^"
The precise issue the Lenz court considered was whether § 512(c)
"requires a copyright owner to consider the fair use doctrine in formulating a
good faith belief that a secondary use of the copyrighted material was
unlawful.''^ Noting that the Copyright Act specifically provides that "the
fair use of a copyrighted work ... is not an infringement of copyright" and is
therefore a lawful use of the protected material, the Lenz court held that:
[T]he fact remains that fair use is a lawful use of a copyright.
Accordingly, in order for a copyright owner to proceed under the
DMCA with "a good faith belief that use of the material in the
manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its
agent, or the law," the owner must evaluate whether the material
makes fair use of the copyright.'^*
In support of its ruling, the Lenz court made several statements which
are relevant to the scenario presented in this article regarding political
speech. The court noted, "the unnecessary removal of non-infringing material
causes significant injury to the public where time-sensitive or controversial
subjects are involved and the counter-notification remedy does not
sufficiently address these harms."'" The Lenz court also contemplated cases
in which an alleged infringement was such an obvious fair use that one could
only conclude that the copyright holder was relying upon the DMCA
inappropriately:
One might imagine a case in which an alleged infringer uses
copyrighted material in a manner that unequivocally qualifies as
fair use, and in addition there is evidence that the copyright owner
deliberately has invoked the DMCA not to protect its copyright but
to prevent such use. See, e.g.. Online Policy Group v. Diebold,
Inc., 337 F.Supp.2d 1195, 1204-05 (N.D.Cal.2OO4) (suggesting that
'^"/í/. at LL53.
' " / í / . at 1154.
'^' /í/. (footnotes and citations omitted).
' "W. at LL56.
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the copyright owner sought to use the DMCA "as a sword to
suppress publication of embarrassing content rather than as a shield
to protect its intellectual property.").'^^
The situation described in this article clearly fits within the type of case
the Lenz court imagined. This article has already made the case that the use
of political debate footage for campaign speech purposes is an unequivocal
fair use. If the use of small portions of copyrighted material for which there
is no secondary market, for purposes of political campaign speech, does not
meet the criteria of fair use, it is hard to imagine what type of use would.'^'
The fact that the networks who deny permission to use debate footage have
not once followed up with a subsequent copyright infringement lawsuit
strongly suggests that they are inappropriately relying upon the DMCA to
suppress content rather than protect their copyrights.
Nonetheless, despite the unequivocal fair use of the debate footage,
most commentators who have analyzed Rossi and Lenz conclude that
copyright holders still have broad discretion to issue take-down notices
because of the subjective status of the good faith requirement. For instance,
Hazelwood writes:
As the case law interpreting section 512(f) now stands, there is
virtually no penalty for copyright owners issuing broad and
questionable takedown notices. As long as the copyright holder
has a subjective belief of infringement, no liability will attach to the
copyright holder for the removal of noninfringing material. The
copyright owner must consider fair use only in the "rare case"
where fair use is obvious. Unfortunately, the courts by adopting
" 'W. at 1155n.5.
" ' As Professor Seltzer stated in her article Free Speech Unmoored in Copyright's Safe
Harbor: Chilling Effects of the DMCA on the First Amendment, supra note 12, at 355-56,
"[i]f there was ever a clear case of non-inñ'inging fair use - speech protected by the First
amendment - this should have been it: a political candidate, seeking to engage in public
multimedia debate, used video snippets from the television programs on which the issues were
discussed." See also, Jordan Sundell, Note, Tempting the Sword of Damocles: Reimagining
the Copyright /DMCA Framework in a UGC World, 12 MiNN. J. L. Sci. & TECH. 335, 355-56
(Winter 2011) ("[C]opyright holders often issue takedowns for non-infringing works (i.e.,
speech) which websites as a matter of course will take down until and unless the UGC up-
loader successfully challenges the request. In other contexts, such as newspapers and books,
courts would strike down such a scheme as a violation of the First Amendment. Similarly,
here, because of the almost non-existent burden required of copyright holders before they
demand allegedly infringing content taken down, copyright holders can effectively restrain
First Amendment rights without judicial oversight. And while copyright law is generally
carved out of First Amendment jurisprudence, the sheer volume of inappropriate takedown
requests suggests that the DMCA does a disservice to free speech by letting copyright holders
trample on the First Amendment in the name of copyright.").
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the subjective standard of knowledge of Rossi, instead of an
objective standard of knowledge as set forth in Online Policy
Group, have made the provisions of section 512(f) virtually
worthless in terms of preventing abuse of the takedown provisions
of the DMCA. In fact, although the DMCA has been in existence
for approximately ten years and there have been thousands of
takedown notices, the decision in Online Policy Group appears to
be the only court decision finding a violation of section 512(f)
against a copyright holder for a knowing material
misrepresentation. ' *°
Indeed, even the Lenz court expressed doubt that Stephanie Lenz could show
the requisite lack of subjective good faith upon remand.'*' Thus, the need for
reform is widely recognized - and justified.
B. DMCA Reform
In addition to the issues regarding political speech discussed in this
paper, DMCA take-down abuse is reportedly widespread.'*^ As an extreme
example, in 2007, Viacom relied upon the DMCA to demand that YouTube
remove over 10,000 unauthorized video clips, some of which Viacom had
uploaded itself'*^ More recently, in 2009, Google (which owns YouTube)
acknowledged that more than half of the takedown notices it received under
the DMCA were sent by businesses targeting a competitor, and thirty seven
percent of all notices it received were invalid claims of copyright
'*" Hazelwood, Jr., supra note 40, at 325. See also, Rubenstrunk, supra note 40, at 810
("Given the new challenges posed by the [Lenz] decision, it is unlikely that internet users will
be able to protect themselves against the abuses of overbearing copyright owners and savvy
web surfers."); Wilson, supra note 150, at 628 ("The scarcity of judgments in favor of Internet
users showed that proving copyright owners' subjective bad faith is extremely challenging.").
' " Lenz, 572 F.Supp.2d at 1156 ("Although the Court has considerable doubt that Lenz will
be able to prove that Universal acted with the subjective bad faith required by Rossi, and
following discovery her claims well may be appropriate for summary judgment, Lenz's
allegations are sufficient at the pleading stage.").
"^ See, e.g., Fred Von Lohman, Unintended Consequences: Twelve Years Under the DMCA,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Feb. 2010), https://www.eff.org/wp/unintended-
consequences-under-dmca.
'" Sundell, supra note 159, at 346. Sundell also relates that one association, the Science
Fiction Writers of America, sent takedown notices for the removal of material over which it
had no copyright protection. In another example, the Recording Industry of America sent a
takedown notice to a University of Pennsylvania faculty member named Peter Usher who had
uploaded a video showing him singing an original a capella song about gamma rays, simply
because his name resembled that of the more famous singer who goes by the one word name
Usher. Id. at 346-47.
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infringement.'*" Abuses such as this, and the case law which allows it, have
prompted many legal scholars and others to call for change.
Preliminarily, regarding the narrow context of the facts presented in this
article, an affirmative holding that the use of debate footage for political
campaign advocacy is a fair use would negate the possibility that a network
could have even a subjective belief that the use is a copyright
infringement.'*' Such a holding may also give pause to copyright holders in
other contexts and would work toward creating a presumption of fair use, at
least in certain circumstances.'** However, broader reform to the DMCA
remains necessary to curb abuses such as those described above.'*'
The suggestions for reform vary, but three proposals stand out as
strongest because they add to the obligation of copyright holders and help to
level the current playing field in which copyright holders have the ability to
remove content with virtually no obligation to first prove infringement. The
first proposal would change the standard required from a subjective to
objective one. The second is to amend the notice-and-takedown procedure in
§ 512(c) in two significant ways. A final approach would create an
exception for secondary uses that raise important speech issues and which do
not economically benefit the user. These suggested reforms shift some of the
burden onto the copyright holder to make at least some preliminary showing
of infringement before the material is removed, and thus align the DMCA
more closely with the common law in important respects.
The most common call for reform would amend the DMCA to overtum
Rossi and provide specifically that § 512(c) and § 512(f) require an objective
rather than subjective good faith that the secondary use is a copyright
' " Ted Gibbons, Google Submission Hammers Section 92A, NEW ZEALAND PC WORLD
MAGAZINE, (Mar. 16, 2009), http://pcworld.co.nz/pcworld/pcw.nsf7feature/google-submission-
hammers-section-92a. Google provided this information in a submission made to the New
Zealand Telecommunications Carriers Forum regarding a proposed draft code of practice for
EPSs in New Zealand. Id.
" ' Campaigns have standing to sue for invalid takedown notices and "[l]awsuits might help."
See Fred Von Lohmann, McCain Campaign Feels DMCA Sting, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUNDATION, (Oct. 14, 2008), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2008/10/mccain-campaign-feels-
dmca-sting. On the other hand, in light of the timing of ads such as these, a campaign may not
be likely to file a lawsuit. See Paul Alan Levy, Abusive Copyright Takedowns Aimed at
McCain and Obama Show the Need to Amend the DMCA, CL&P BLOG (Oct. 16, 2008),
http://pubcit.typepad.com/clpblog/2008/10/abusive-copyright.html ("[L]awsuits are a needless
distraction to political campaigns that have more immediate tasks . . .").
'** Sundell argues that in situations such as that in Lenz, when the secondary user borrows
only a small amount of the copyrighted material, there should be a presumption of fair use
which the copyright holder must overcome to support an infringement claim. See Sundell,
supra note 159, at 353-57.
'* 5ee 5«pra text accompanying notes 160-61.
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infringement.'*^ This change would require copyright holders to do a more
in-depth analysis of whether the secondary use is lawful because they must
consider the reasonableness of such a conclusion. A move to an objective
good faith standard would undoubtedly solve the issue described in this
article regarding the networks' inappropriate reliance upon the DMCA
because a claim that this type of use is a copyright infringement is simply
unreasonable. It would also have important broader impact as well - for
instance, the outcome in Lenz would undoubtedly result in favor of the use in
that case.
Significant revisions of the notice and takedown procedure of § 512(c)
are also warranted. First, as the DMCA is currently written, the copyright
holder is not required to contact the party who posted the allegedly infringing
content before issuing a takedown notice.'*' Imposing an obligation that the
sender of the takedown notice should first give notice of the complaint to the
user, if possible, before the takedown occurs, would give the user an
immediate opportunity to respond with an effective counter-notice that may
prevent the takedown from happening.'^" Some countries within the
Etiropean Union, such as France, provide for a similar process through which
the copyright holder first notifies the secondary user of the claim of
copyright infringement and includes such correspondence in its notification
to the ISP.'^' In addition to the benefit of resolving some issues quickly and
'** See, e.g., Hazelwood, supra note 40, at 325 ("Legislative change to amend section 512 is
the proper course ..."); Sundell, supra note 159, at 350 ("To remedy the inadequacies of the
system. Congress should amend the DMCA . . . [to] put some teeth into the requirement that
copyright holders must show a good faith basis for issuing a takedown request"); Miller, supra
note 150, at 1724 ("As the law develops in this area. Congress and the courts should consider
adopting an objective standard of good faith instead of a subjective one, as well as importing
existing copyright and intellectual properfy remedies to give 'teeth' to Lenz's deterrent
efforts."); Schonauer, supra note 149, at 161 ("My proposal envisions a twofold improvement
of the DMCA: (1) courts should construe the knowing misrepresentation language as a
'known or should have known' standard in § 512(f) actions, similar to the standard adopted in
Diebold. . .").
' " Levy, supra note 165.
"" Id. See also. Letter from Paul Alan Levy and Joan Claybrook on behalfofCitizen.org to
Senator John McCain and Senator Barack Obama (Oct. 16, 2008),
http://www.citizen.org/documents/DMCALetter.pdf.
' " Thibault Verbiest, Gerald Spindler, Giovanni Maria Riccio, and Aurelie Van de Perre,
Study on the Liability of Internet Intermediaries (Nov. 12, 2007), at 46,
http://ec.europa.euy intemal_market/e-commerce/docs/study/liabilify/final_report_en.pdf.
Although the procedure in France is optional, it is still worth examining. If the copyright
holder follows the suggested process, the ISP is then presumed to know that a violation exists
and, presumably, has no further obligation to review the claim itself. The notification is to
include "a copy of the correspondence addressed to the author or producer of the disputed
information or activities requesting them to be stopped, removed or amended, or proof that the
author or producer could not be contacted." Id. Interestingly, some EU member-states place
even more formal notification requirements upon the copyright holders before the ISP is
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privately, a statement of its attempt to contact the user would also help a
copyright holder justify its required good faith belief that the material
actually infringes upon the copyright.
Second, the ten to fourteen day waiting period currently imposed upon
ISPs before they are obligated to retum the content should be removed."'^ If
the ISP notifies the user that the copyright holder believes the use infringes,
and the copyright holder is informed of such notice, then the burden should
be upon the copyright holder to enforce its copyright protection if the user
fails to comply by taking the material down. This approach aligns the
DMCA more closely with the process for copyright protection in non-digital
circumstances.
A third revision would expand the requirements of the takedown notice
provision to require copyright holders not only to state that they have a good
faith belief that the secondary use is infringing, but also to affirmatively
justify this belief by providing the steps taken to reach it.
The copyright owner should be required to describe the steps it
took and persuade the court of its good faith by a preponderance of
the evidence. This is not a proposal for a reasonable investigation,
only that the copyright owner need come forward with evidence
sufficient to form a good-faith belief. For legitimate complaints
and honest mistakes, this will be easy to do and will not chill the
rights of copyright owners; they should already have such
information from their initial review of the website, as the DMCA
requires."^
Some countries within the European Union have taken this approach.
For instance, the French notification procedure requires the copyright holder
to include, among other relevant material, "the reasons for which the content
must be removed, including an indication of the legal provisions and
justification of the facts."''"
presumed to know of the allegedly infringing content. According to the Study, some LSPs
have refused to respond to an "unofficial" takedown notice. For instance, Spanish law
"establishes that the service provider shall be understood to be genuinely aware when 'a
competent body has declared the data to be illegal, has ordered its removal or that access to the
data be blocked' . . ." The '"competent body' can be a court or an administrative authority...
." Id at 42. Similarly, Italian law "requires providers to act expeditiously (to remove or to
disable access to the information) only upon notice fi-om the relevant authorities." Id. at 44.
"' See Letter fi-om Levy and Claybrook, supra note L70; Levy, Abusive Copyright Takedowns,
supra note L65.
' " Wilson, supra note 150, at 632.
"'' Verbiest, Spindler et al., SMpro note 171, at 45-46. In addition to changing the language of
§ 5L2(c), many scholars advocate for the Increased availability of attomeys fees in cases in
which copyright holders have violated § 512. See, e.g.. Levy, supra note 165 ("Statutory
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Finally, in addition to amending § 512(c) in significant ways, an
altemative approach would take into account the importance of the speech in
question. Certainly regarding matters of national significance such as
political speech, a strong argument can be made that the DMCA take-down
provisions simply should not apply, especially when the material is not used
for commercial gain.'" A related option would be to amend the DMCA to
provide for expedited review procedures in situations in which important
speech is involved.'^* For instance, the statute could be revised to provide
for immediate hearing and/or counter-notice provisions when speech of
national importance is at issue. As suggested previously, such a review
would still give the copyright holder the opportunity to immediately file for a
preliminary injunction in the event that the material tmly infringes.
Many commentators have suggested that resolving the issue of DMCA
take-down abuses could be done, at least in part, by increasing the obligation
of ISPs to monitor more closely their platforms for material that infringes
upon copyright protection."' For instance, Sundell maintains:
While copyright law and the DMCA treat individual users too
harshly, they fail to treat OSPs strongly enough. The DMCA
exemplifies the phrase "ignorance is bliss" since OSPs need not act
unless they know of a violation. If the OSP does not investigate, it
will not discover any violations and, therefore, will not have to take
action. Additionally, a plaintifPs burden of proof for showing an
damage should be available whenever a takedown notice is determined to have been applied to
noninfringing material... . [T]he degree of good faith of the sender of the takedown notice
should affect the amount of the statutory damages, but not their availability."); Miller, supra
note 150, at 1728; Schonauer, supra note 149, at 161 ("a statutorily imposed mandatory
attorney's fees and costs provision should make available financial assistance to those who
vindicate fair use rights."); In a similar vein, others have asked for a form of "public shaming"
by requiring the senders of takedown notices to post their notices on a public database. See
Letter from Levy and Claybrook, supra note 170; Levy, Abusive Copyright Takedowns, supra
note 165.
"^ Sundell, supra note 159, at 350-51. Sundell suggests granting immunity "to users who
copy an entire work that is an important cultural moment or interaction and reproduce it with
no attempt to profit or reduce the value of the work." Similarly, Hazelwood suggests that §
512 "should be changed so that the automatic right of takedown only applies to instances
where all or substantially all of the copyrighted material is being used and the alleged
infHnging use competes with the original. The right of takedown without court approval is an
extraordinary right and it should only be granted for the extraordinary circumstances, such as
digital privacy." Hazelwood, supra note 40, at 331-32 (emphasis added).
' F o r instance, Hungarian law allows the user to file a counter-notice within eight days of
receiving a takedown notice, after which the ISP must expeditiously replace the material. See
Verbiest, Spindler et al., supra note 171, at 107-08.
' " The DMCA changes suggested above, which require additional information to be included
in takedown notices, will necessarily place additional burdens on the ISP to be sure the
takedown notice complies with the new requirements.
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OSP's knowledge is significant. In concert, a copyright holder's
high burden of proof and OSPs' studious ignorance effectively
insulate OSPs fi-om liability."^
While an interesting and seemingly logical approach, decreasing ISP
immunity is likely to result in more instances in which content is removed
rather than less and thus have a continued chilling effect on speech. ISPs
have immunity now and yet abuses prevail."' Increasing ISP liability is not
lücely to change that. Indeed, the recent controversy over the Stop Online
Piracy Act (SOPA) reveals the inherent challenges associated with changing
the balance of ISP immunity.'^" Moreover, it is not the ISPs who initiate
invalid takedowns; it is copyright holders who do so. As such, the
appropriate place for reform to begin is with them.'^'
Finally, it is important to point out that many observers believe that ISPs
such as YouTube should engage in more self-policing of their sites.'^^ ISP
" ' Sundell, supra note 159, at 360-61. See also, Doug Lichtman and Eric Posner, Holding
Internet Service Providers Accountable, John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No.
217, 5, University of Chicago Law School, July, 2004 ("Our point is simply that, faced with
the growing problem of cyber-insecurity, ISPs should be called into the service of the law. . . .
Service providers control the gateway through which Internet pests enter and reenter the
system. As such, service providers can help to stop these pests before they spread and to
identify the individuals who originate them in the first place. ISPs should be required by law
to engage in these precautions."); Ryan Radia, Why SOPA Threatens the DMCA Safe Harbor,
TECHLIBERATION.COM (NOV. 18, 2011), http://techliberation.com/2011/ll/18/why-sopa-
threatens-the-dmca-safe-harbor/ ("Critics . . . allege that the safe harbor has been construed so
broadly that it shields service providers that are deliverably indifferent to their users'
infringing activities, however rampant they may be.").
" 5ee sM/7ra text accompanying notes 162-64.
"" Certain sections of SOPA are subject to interpretation and, according to Radia,
"enormously troubling." Radia, supra note 178. For instance, the language which defmes a
"foreign infringing website" does not contain any requirement that the operator have any
knowledge of possibly infringing content to face possible criminal liability for its existence.
The proposed Act allows for civil forfeiture in some circumstances "simply because the outlet
has been used in some unlawful manner" presumably by others. Id. Also, SOPA provides for
a different type of notice-and-takedown provision in which copyright holders who believe
infringing content has been posted on a particular ISP are allowed "to attach entire websites by
cutting off their access to payment and ad networks." Id. Because of the possibilities of being
cut-off from payment due to application of other portions of SOPA, the fear is that "website
operators will likely do everything they can to avoid falling under SOPA's definitions - even
if that means going above and beyond the requirements of the DMCA safe harbor." Id. In
other words, more content comes dovwi so that YouTube can avoid the possibility of liability.
'*' See Von Lohmann, supra note 165 ("Let's start by identifying the real villains here: the
major news media outlets. They are the ones censoring these political ads, based on the use of
a few seconds of their footage.... So let's start by shaming the bad guys here.").
'^ ^ See supra text accompanying note 11. Self-policing is also one approach taken in several
EU countries. Many European nations belong to associations which adhere to particular self-
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self-policing is not without precedent. In at least one circumstance, YouTube
voluntarily completed a fair use analysis and reposted the content before the
counter notice expiration date.'^^ The Electronic Frontier Foundation urges
this approach (as well as others), suggesting that ISPs have "no need to
follow the DMCA safe harbor procedures if the disputed content is a clear
fair use and, as a result, there's no risk of liability."'^" Also, given Google's
statement in New Zealand,'^' YouTube obviously does indeed closely
monitor and assess the material on its site, which indicates that a review of at
least some important content is plausible, contrary to its assertions elsewhere
that legal review in certain circumstances "is not a viable option."'^*
Nonetheless, incidents of self-policing are clearly the exception rather than
the mle. YouTube specifically declined to conduct a fair use analysis when
requested to do so by the McCain campaign. One instance since then does
not indicate a change of heart.'^'
VI. CONCLUSION
The use of political debate footage in campaign advertising is
unequivocally a fair use. A judicial holding to that effect would help
encourage important political speech in at least two ways. First, it would
establish a solid precedent upon which campaigns and network news
organizations can rely in future election cycles. Second, it would help to
effect a necessary change in application of the DMCA. The law as it is
currently interpreted unnecessarily assumes copyright infringement, despite
the implications on political speech. Rather than erring on the side of
allowing important speech, the law restricts it without a valid showing of
proof that the speech is entitled to be restricted.
IPTV general manager Peter Morrill suggested that restricting the use of
debate footage is in the "public good" to avoid a possible chilling effect on
participation in future debates.'^^ This may be true to some degree (although
regulatory codes of conduct which "a provider uses in order to handle complaints about illicit
content or access to illicit websites." See Verbiest, Spindler et al., supra note 171, at 110-13.
"•' Ben Sheffrier, YouTube Restores National Organization for Marriage Video Early, Citing
Fair Use, COPYRIGHTS & CAMPAIGNS BLOG (May 7, 2009),
http://copyrightsandcampaigns.blogspot.com/2009/05/youtube-restores-national-
organization.html.
'*" Tim Jones, YouTube Restores a Fair Use, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOLWDATION (May 7,
2009), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/05/youtube-restores.
"^ See Gibbons, supra note 164.
"* See Stirland, supra note 12.
' " An affirmative holding that the use of debate footage for political campaign advocacy is a
fair use would certainly give ISPs such as YouTube a stronger basis upon which to ignore
takedown notices, despite their current reluctance to do so.
' See Grey, supra note 20.
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not all agree).'^' Some candidates, especially at the local level, may refuse to
participate in a public debate to protect and control their public images,
which could impact on the public's right to hear the candidates speak and
inhibit the use of this particular avenue for political speech. However, even
assuming that some candidates will opt out of publicly televised debates, a
ruling against fair use could have a far more dire outcome - a chilling effect
on political speech itself As the Open Debate Coalition argued, the
networks' attempt to exercise "control over political speech is inconsistent
with our democracy."^^'^ First Amendment scholar Wendy Seltzer makes a
strong argument regarding the DMCA's chilling effect on speech:
Writing for the Court in Citizens United., Justice Kennedy
concluded that the election laws - which restricted the financing of
speech, and thus the opportunity to speak - functioned 'as the
equivalent of prior restraint' on speech.
The same reasoning should apply to the barriers that copyright
secondary liability and the DMCA pose to speakers. These barriers
function as a prior restraint by inducing the necessary service
provider to take down speech before, and often in the absence of, a
judicial determination of its infringing nature.'"
The Center for Democracy and Technology also suggests that this
chilling effect may be deeper than the simple removal of content.
[IJnappropriate takedown notices can chill campaign speech in
ways that go beyond the removal of a particular video. The DMCA
contains a prerequisite to the safe harbor that requires content hosts
to have 'adopted and reasonably implemented ... a policy that
provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of ...
repeat infringers.' Many sites meet this requirement by canceling
user accounts after a specified number of DMCA takedown notices
are received regarding that account. Such policies are of particular
concem for campaigns because they are 'serial fair users' whose
videos regularly include short footage from news broadcasts.
" ' Then-Senator Obama wrote in a letter to Democratic National Committee Chair Howard
Dean in support of the Open Debate Coalition's movement: "We have incentive enough to
debate." Lessig, Obama on "Open Debates, " supra note 4. See also, Lessig, A Call on the
RNC, supra note 3.
"" Lessig, Free Debates, supra note 2 (emphasis added).
' " Seltzer, supra note 12, at 175 ("In the wake oiCitizens United, why can copyright law
remove political videos from public reach when campaign finance law must not?" (referring to
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010)).
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Several of the campaign staff we interviewed for this report
expressed this as the nightmare scenario: a campaign gets three
spurious takedowns for videos on its YouTube account, causing the
entire account to be shut down. This could be devastating to any
campaign that had invested considerable resources in developing an
online presence.
This fear, several of the campaign professionals told us, can have a
chilling effect on the creation of ads that incorporate broadcast
footage. Particularly if a campaign has already been targeted by a
takedown notice - however unwarranted - it may shy away from
making additional ads that could elicit additional notices. In short,
takedown demands that ignore fair use can have an impact not just
on the specific ads the notices target, but on the content of a
campaign's future ads as well."^
In the heated last weeks of an election, this chilling effect may be even
more pronounced because the damage is irreparable."^ Thus, the law should
be changed to uphold the fundamental principal that political speech is
necessary to the proper operation of democracy.
" ' Campaign Takedown Troubles, supra note 10, at 17.
' " Id. at L6 ("[A]LO-business-day wait to get a video put back online makes filing a counter-
notice even less worth the effort given the fast pace of political campaigns. In a political
campaign, LO business days can be a Lifetime, and the removal of important and timely non-
infringing campaign videos for such a period can reduce their effectiveness and potentially
impact an election. Ln other words, the damage is often done by the time a video can be put
back online.").
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